14.10.2020 • 22/2020
Economic slump in East Germany not as severe as in Germany as a whole ‒ Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast and new data for East Germany
The German economy started recovering quickly after the drastic pandemic-related slump in spring 2020. The recovery, however, loses much of its momentum in the second half of the year. The Joint Economic Forecast predicts that production levels seen before the crisis will not be reached again until the second half of 2021. In principle, the East German economy is following this pattern, although the economic slump is likely to be somewhat milder.
Oliver Holtemöller
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14.10.2020 • 21/2020
Recovery Loses Momentum ‒ Economy and Politics Still Shaped by the Pandemic
The corona pandemic leaves substantial marks in the German economy and its impact is more persistent than assumed in spring. In their autumn report, the leading German economic research institutes have revised their economic outlook downwards by roughly one percentage point for both this and next year. They now expect gross domestic product to fall by 5.4% in 2020 (previously -4.2%) and to grow by 4.7% (5.8%) in 2021 and 2.7% in 2022.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Trade Effects of Silver Price Fluctuations in 19th-Century China: A Macro Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Lin Zhang
China Economic Journal,
2020
Abstract
We assess the role of silver price fluctuations in Chinese trade and GDP during the late Qing dynasty, when China still had a bimetallic (silver/copper) monetary system, in which silver was mostly used for international trade. Using a structural VAR (SVAR) with blockwise recursive identification, we identify the impact of silver price shocks on the Chinese economy from 1867, when trade data became available, to 1910, one year before the Qing dynasty collapsed. We find that silver price shocks had a sizable impact on both imports and exports but only a very minor effect on the trade balance, only a marginal impact on growth, and almost no effect on domestic prices. Stronger effects were partly mitigated by inelastic export quantities. Generally, the effect of silver price shocks, while considerable, was only short-lived, displaying no persistence in either direction. We find that the bimetallic system in Qing China might have mitigated a potential positive effect of silver depreciation but did not reverse the effect, which – contrary to claims made in the previous literature – was responsible for neither the worsening trade balance nor the inflation and the quickly increasing imports that occurred during our sample period.
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16.09.2020 • 18/2020
Economy recovers from the shutdown – but a quick return to pre-crisis normality is unlikely
The German economy has bounced back strongly over the summer, recovering a considerable part of the production slump caused by the shutdown in spring. Nevertheless, real gross domestic product in 2020 is likely to contract by 5.7%. In 2021, growth is expected to average 3.2% according to IWH autumn economic forecast. The decline in production in 2020 is likely to be less pronounced in East Germany com¬pared to Germany as a whole.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Konjunktur aktuell: Wirtschaft erholt sich vom Corona-Schock – aber keine schnelle Rückkehr zur
alten Normalität
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Die Corona-Pandemie hat die Weltwirtschaft im ersten Halbjahr 2020 drastisch einbrechen lassen. Im Sommer wurden viele Aktivitäten aber wiederaufgenommen, und ein großer Teil des Einbruchs dürfte im zweiten Halbjahr wieder wettgemacht werden. Einige wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten wie der Tourismus oder Verkehrsdienstleistungen werden allerdings noch eine Weile eingeschränkt bleiben.
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Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.
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Special Issue on Productivity: Introduction
Filippo di Mauro
Singapore Economic Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
At the time we write this introduction, the world is entering a second phase of the COVID-pandemic, where all countries in the world attempt to gradually reopen after the tremendous shock on lives and economic activity. The focus of the policies right now is very much on short-term interventions aimed at alleviating the financial strains on households and firms, thus fostering a quicker recovery. In the medium and long-term perspective, however, it would be essential to parallel such policies with appropriate interventions aimed at strengthening the aggregate productivity of the economy, with the objective of increasing resilience and foster more solid growth foundations.
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Promoting Higher Productivity in China — Does Innovation Expenditure Really Matter?
Hoang Minh Duy, Filippo di Mauro, Jo Van Biesebroeck
Singapore Economic Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
The slowing down of the global economy adds additional challenges to China? economic policies as the country orchestrates its transition to lower resource dependency and higher technology intensity of output. Are policies aimed at technologically advanced sectors the right answer? Drawing from a newly created dataset of firms? balance sheets over the period 1998?2013, matched with patents data until 2009, we uncover that expenditure in innovation had limited effect on boosting productivity, without generating a clear gain in overall productivity for the high-tech sector. As a matter of fact, there is a much higher dispersion in productivity outcomes in firms belonging to the low-technology sectors, which derives from a bunch of champions in those sectors scoring higher productivity dynamics than in the High-technology sectors. The paper finds those barriers to entry and in general, market power of incumbents in the high-tech generate less than optimal resource reallocation, which hampers the overall productivity. Policies should presumably aim at removing such obstacles rather than solely promote innovation expenditure.
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06.07.2020 • 13/2020
IWH issues warning of a new banking crisis
The coronavirus recession could mean the end for dozens of banks across Germany – even if Germany survives the economic crisis relatively unscathed. An analysis by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that many savings banks and cooperative banks are particularly at risk. Loans worth hundreds of billions of euros are on the balance sheets of the financial institutions concerned. IWH President Gropp warns of a potentially high additional burden for the already weakened real economy.
Reint E. Gropp
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The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
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