Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Julia Cagé, William R. Kerr
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
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CEO Political Preference and Corporate Tax Sheltering
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun, Qiang Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2016
Abstract
We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs' tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
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Upturn Remains Moderate — Economic Policy Lacks Growth Orientation
Roland Döhrn, Ferdinand Fichtner, Oliver Holtemöller, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich in einem moderaten Aufschwung. Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt die Mitte April veröffentlichte Gemeinschaftsdiagnose der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte demnach in diesem Jahr um 1,6% und im kommenden Jahr um 1,5% zulegen. Getragen wird der Aufschwung vom privaten Konsum, der vom anhaltenden Beschäftigungsaufbau, den spürbaren Steigerungen der Lohn- und Transfereinkommen und den Kaufkraftgewinnen infolge der gesunkenen Energiepreise profitiert.
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14.04.2016 • 15/2016
Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2016: Upturn Remains Moderate – Economic Policy Lacks Growth Orientation
Economic research institutes now estimate that gross domestic product will increase by 1.6 percent in 2016, instead of 1.8 percent as forecast in autumn 2015.
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Nested Models and Model Uncertainty
Alexander Kriwoluzky, Christian A. Stoltenberg
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
Uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models is a concern for optimal policy when policy prescriptions from those models differ. The standard procedure is to specify a prior over the parameter space, ignoring the special status of submodels (e.g., those resulting from zero restrictions). Following Sims (2008, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32, 2460–2475), we treat nested submodels as probability models, and we formalize a procedure that ensures that submodels are not discarded too easily and do matter for optimal policy. For the United States, we find that optimal policy based on our procedure leads to substantial welfare gains compared to the standard procedure.
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Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States
Viktor Slavtchev, Simon Wiederhold
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates the role of the technological content of government procurement in innovation. In a theoretical model, we first show that a shift in the composition of public purchases toward high-tech products translates into higher economy-wide returns to innovation, leading to an increase in the aggregate level of private R&D. Using unique data on federal procurement in US states and performing panel fixed-effects estimations, we find support for the model's prediction of a positive R&D effect of the technological content of government procurement. Instrumental-variable estimations suggest a causal interpretation of our findings.
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The Diablo 3 Economy: An Agent Based Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Computational Economics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
Designers of MMOs such as Diablo 3 face economic problems much like policy makers in the real world, e.g. inflation and distributional issues. Solving economic problems through regular updates (patches) became as important to those games as traditional gameplay issues. In this paper we provide an agent framework inspired by the economic features of Diablo 3 and analyze the effect of monetary policy in the game. Our model reproduces a number of features known from the Diablo 3 economy such as a heterogeneous price development, driven almost exclusively by goods of high quality, a highly unequal wealth distribution and strongly decreasing economic mobility. The basic framework presented in this paper is meant as a stepping stone to further research, where our evidence is used to deepen our understanding of the real-world counterparts of such problems. The advantage of our model is that it combines simplicity that is inherent to model economies with a similarly simple observable counterpart (namely the game environment where real agents interact). By matching the dynamics of the game economy we can thus easily verify that our behavioral assumptions are good approximations to reality.
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