Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
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21.06.2016 • 25/2016
German Federal Constitutional Court makes right decision on Draghis OMT programme
I welcome the decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The court approved OMT (outright monetary transactions), which enables the European Central Bank (ECB) to purchase short-term government bonds in secondary markets in order to stabilize euro member countries in a crisis.
Reint E. Gropp
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Modelling Macroeconomic Risk: The Genesis of the European Debt Crisis
Gregor von Schweinitz
Hochschulschrift, Juristische und Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg,
2013
Abstract
Diverging European sovereign bond yields after 2008 are the most visible sign of the European debt crisis. This dissertation examines in a first step, to which extent the development of yields is driven by credit and liquidity risk, and how it is influenced by general uncertainty on financial markets. It can be shown that yields are driven to a significant degree by a flight towards bonds of high liquidity in times of high market uncertainty. In a second step, high yields are interpreted as a sign of an existing crisis in the respective country. Using the signals approach, the early-warning capabilities of four different proposals for the design of the scoreboard as part of the “Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure” (introduced in December 2011 by the European Commission) are tested, advocating a scoreboard including a variety of many different indicators. In a third step, the methodology of the signals approach is extended to include also results on significance.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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The Term Structure of Sovereign Default Risk in EMU Member Countries and Its Determinants
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.
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Towards a Europeanization of Wage Bargaining? Evidence from the Metal Sector
Vera Glassner, Toralf Pusch
European Journal of Industrial Relations,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
European trade unions have attempted to coordinate their bargaining strategies transnationally in order to counter downward pressures on wages. Such coordination is most feasible in broadly integrated and exposed sectors that have to face common competitive constraints on wages. This article investigates collectively negotiated wage increases in the metal sector in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. We assume a specific logic of transnational pattern bargaining, with Germany as the ‘anchor’ country. We investigate the emergence of a transnational wage coordination effect before and after institutions for the coordination of wage bargaining were established. Finally, we draw conclusions on prospects for wage bargaining coordination with further integration of Economic and Monetary Union.
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Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe
Tobias Knedlik, Gregor von Schweinitz
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
European authorities and scholars published proposals on which indicators of macroeconomic imbalances might be used to uncover risks for the sustainability of public debt in the European Union. We test the ability of four proposed sets of indicators to send early-warnings of debt crises using a signals approach for the study of indicators and the construction of composite indicators. We find that a broad composite indicator has the highest predictive power. This fact still holds true if equal weights are used for the construction of the composite indicator in order to reflect the uncertainty about the origin of future crises.
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The Synchronization of Wage Dynamics across EMU Members: A Test of the Endogeneity Hypothesis
Herbert S. Buscher, Hubert Gabrisch
Empirica,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
We test the hypothesis of an endogenous currency area for the labor market of the Euro area: has the introduction of a common currency caused wage dynamics to become more synchronized and to be able to cushion for asymmetric shocks? Trade intensity, sector specialization and financial integration are tested for being the driving forces for the endogenous synchronization of wage dynamics. We use regression techniques with instrument variables, and find evidence of persistent asymmetries in nominal wage formation, despite a single currency and monetary policy. We explain the result with more specialization following financial integration, and with still existing differences in wage formation and labor market institutions. We conclude that the euro zone is not endogenous with respect to wage formation. Rather, there are incentives for beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the Euro area.
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