Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis
Christian Growitsch, Heike Wetzel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.
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Liberalization of Electricity Markets in Selected European Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Keim, P. J. J. Welfens
Diskussionsbeiträge des Europäischen Instituts für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW), Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Nr. 124,
No. 124,
2004
Abstract
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Fragen der Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte in der EU. Man kann feststellen, dass die Gemeinschaftsdirektive 96/92/EC die Wechselbeziehungen der Elektrizitätsmärkte nicht ausreichend behandelt. Außerdem wird vor allem in Deutschland der Zugang für Dritte nicht effektiv gefördert, wobei der Zusammenschluss eines großen Elektrizitätsunternehmens und einem dominanten Gasunternehmen neue spezielle Fragen aufgeworfen hat. Hingegen verläuft der Liberalisierungsprozess in Skandinavien konsequenter. Osteuropäische EU-Beitrittsländer sind langfristig potenzielle Elektrizitätsexporteure sobald Modernisierungen zu niedrigeren Energie- und Elektrizitätsverbrauch führen. Russland sollte rasch WTO-Mitglied werden, um Zugang zu den westeuropäischen Elektrizitätsmärkten zu bekommen, wobei Russland in den gesamten Liberalisierungsdiskussionen noch keine Rolle gespielt hat. Mittelfristig können Überschusskapazitäten in einer EU-27 erwartet werden. Zweifelhaft jedoch ist, ob Politiker, die ansonsten so ehrgeizige Ambitionen in der Umweltpolitik zeigen, einer gesamteuropäischen Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte zustimmen werden. Außerdem werden regulierungspolitische Aspekte behandelt.
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On the Incentives to Provide Fuel-Efficient Automobiles
Hans Degryse, Andreas Irmen
Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2001
Abstract
We argue that the provision of more fuel-efficient cars necessitates specific aerodynamic shapes. We show that the presence of this technological constraint may reduce the incentives to provide fuel efficiency. In equilibrium, cars become more similar and aerodynamic as fuel prices increase. However, the provided level of fuel efficiency falls short of the social optimal one such that a fuel-economy standard is welfare-enhancing.
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Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-Expert
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a 'timid-pricing' equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an 'aggressive-pricing' equilibrium pops up. For intermediate values of the non-expert's successful repair a 'mixed-pricing' equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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