At a Glance
IWH at a Glance The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association was founded on January 1, 1992. It is a member of the Leibniz Association. It…
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To Securitize or To Price Credit Risk?
Danny McGowan, Huyen Nguyen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
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Privacy
Data Protection Policy We take the protection of your personal data very seriously and treat your personal data with confidentiality and in compliance with the provisions of law…
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Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme
Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme InvKG = Coal Regions Investment Act STARK = Strengthening the Transformation Dynamics and Awakening in the Coalfields and…
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Poison Bonds
Shuo Xia, Rex Wang Renjie
SSRN Discussion Paper,
2023
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of "poison bonds", which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% after 2005. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Further analyses suggest that this practice entrenches incumbent managers, coincidentally benefits bondholders, but destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for understanding the agency benefits and costs of debt: (1) more debt does not necessarily discipline the management; and (2) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Economic Outlook
IWH Summer Forecast 2024 German economy still on the defensive – but first signs of an end to the downturn June 13, 2024 In the first half of 2024, signs of an economic recovery…
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Department Profiles
Research Profiles of the IWH Departments All doctoral students are allocated to one of the four research departments (Financial Markets – Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets –…
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Teaching
Teaching Within the framework of its cooperations with both German and foreign universities IWH researchers are actively committed to teaching by offering academic courses. These…
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Department Profiles
Research Profiles of the IWH Departments All doctoral students are allocated to one of the four research departments (Financial Markets – Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets –…
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East Germany
The Nasty Gap 30 years after unification: Why East Germany is still 20% poorer than the West Dossier In a nutshell The East German economic convergence process is hardly…
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