The Effect of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Incheol Kim, Haimeng Teng, Qiang Wu
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,
March
2022
Abstract
We find that foreign institutional investors (FIIs) reduce their investee firms’ tax avoidance. We provide evidence that the effect is driven by the institutional distance between FIIs’ home countries/regions and host countries/regions. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the influence of FIIs from countries/regions with high-quality institutions (i.e., common law, high government effectiveness, and high regulatory quality) on investee firms located in countries/regions with low-quality institutions. Furthermore, we show that the effect is concentrated on FIIs with little experience in the investee countries/regions or FIIs with stronger monitoring incentives. Finally, we find that FIIs are more likely to vote against management if the firm has a higher level of tax avoidance.
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The State Expropriation Risk and the Pricing of Foreign Earnings
Iftekhar Hasan, Ibrahim Siraj, Amine Tarazi, Qiang Wu
Journal of International Accounting Research,
No. 2,
2021
Abstract
We examine the pricing of U.S. multinational firms' foreign earnings in regard to their risk of expropriation and unfair treatment by the governments of the countries in which their international subsidiaries are located. Using 8,891 firm-years observations during the 2001–2013 period, we find that the value relevance of foreign earnings increases with the improvement of the protection from state expropriation risk in the subsidiary host-countries. Our results are not driven by the earnings management practice, investor distraction, country informativeness, and political and trade relationship of a foreign country with the U.S. Furthermore, our results are robust to the confounding effects of country factors, measurement error in the variable of the risk of expropriation, the influence of private contracting institutions, and endogeneity in the decision of the location of subsidiaries.
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Managerial Ability and Value Relevance of Earnings
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Ibrahim Siraj, Qiang Wu
China Accounting and Finance Review,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
We examine how management ability affects the extent to which capital markets rely on earnings to value equity. Using a measure of ability that captures a management team’s capacity for generating revenues with a given level of resources compared to other industry peers, we find a strong positive association between managerial ability and the value relevance of earnings. Additional tests show that our results are robust to controlling for earnings attributes and investment efficiency. We use propensity score matching and the 2SLS instrumental variable approach to deal with the issue of endogeneity. For further identification, we examine CEO turnover and find that newly hired CEOs with better managerial abilities than the replaced CEOs increase the value relevance of earnings. We identify weak corporate governance and product market power as the two important channels through which superior management practices play an important role in the corporate decision-making process that positively influence the value relevance of earnings. Overall, our findings suggest that better managers make accounting information significantly more relevant in the market valuation of equity.
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Benchmark on Themselves: CEO-directors’ Influence on the CEO Compensation
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Managerial Finance,
No. 7,
2019
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms.
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Private Benefits of Control and Bank Loan Contracts
Chih-Yung Lin, Wei-Che Tsai, Iftekhar Hasan, Le Quoc Tuan
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2018
Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of control. Results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance quality, supporting the agency cost viewpoint. Such evidence implies that banks consider higher private benefits of control as a type of agency problem when they make lending decisions.
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Do Managerial Risk-taking Incentives Influence Firms' Exchange Rate Exposure?
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Delroy M. Hunter, Yun Zhu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2017
Abstract
There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.
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Bank Overall Financial Strength: Islamic Versus Conventional Banks
Michael Doumpos, Iftekhar Hasan, Fotios Pasiouras
Economic Modelling,
2017
Abstract
A number of recent studies compare the performance of Islamic and conventional banks with the use of individual financial ratios or efficiency frontier techniques. The present study extends this strand of the literature, by comparing Islamic banks, conventional banks, and banks with an Islamic window with the use of a bank overall financial strength index. This index is developed with a multicriteria methodology that allows us to aggregate various criteria capturing bank capital strength, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and management quality in controlling expenses. We find that banks differ significantly in terms of individual financial ratios; however, the difference of the overall financial strength between Islamic and conventional banks is not statistically significant. This finding is confirmed with both univariate comparisons and in multivariate regression estimations. When we look at the bank financial strength within regions, we find that conventional banks outperform both the Islamic banks and the banks with Islamic window in the case of Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council; however, Islamic banks perform better in the MENA and Senegal region. Second stage regressions also reveal that the bank overall financial strength index is influenced by various country-specific attributes. These include control of corruption, government effectiveness, and operation in one of the seven countries that are expected to drive the next big wave in Islamic finance.
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The Effects of Local Elections on National Military Spending: A Cross-country Study
Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun
Defence and Peace Economics,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
In this paper, we study the domestic political determinants of military spending. Our conceptual framework suggests that power distribution over local and central governments influences the government provision of national public goods, in our context, military expenditure. Drawing on a large cross-country panel, we demonstrate that having local elections will decrease a country’s military expenditure markedly, controlling for other political and economic variables. According to our preferred estimates, a country’s military expenditure is on average 20% lower if its state government officials are locally elected, which is consistent with our theoretical prediction.
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Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
Michael Koetter, Natalia Podlich, Michael Wedow
ECB Working Paper Series,
No. 2017,
2017
Abstract
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
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Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Constraints in Multinational Enterprises – An Analysis in Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013 –
Andrea Gauselmann, Felix Noth
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
In our analysis, we consider the distribution of decision power over financing and investment between MNEs’ headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and its influence on the foreign affiliates’ financial restrictions. Our research results show that headquarters of multinational enterprises have not (yet) moved much decision power to their foreign subsidiaries at all. We use data from the IWH FDI Micro Database which contains information on corporate governance structures and financial restrictions of 609 enterprises with a foreign investor in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and East Germany. We match data from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database on financial characteristics. We find that a high concentration of decision power within the MNE’s headquarter implicates high financial restrictions within the subsidiary. Square term results show, however, that the effect of financial constraints within the subsidiary decreases and finally turns insignificant when decision power moves from headquarter to subsidiary. Thus, economic policy should encourage foreign investors in the case of foreign acquisition of local enterprises to leave decision power within the enterprise and in the case of Greenfield investment to provide the newly established subsidiaries with as much power over corporate governance structures as possible.
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