Independent State Aid Control in the Enlarged European Union
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, Johannes Stephan
Unabhängige staatliche Organisationen in der Demokratie. Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik Bd. 337,
2013
Abstract
Die Kontrolle staatlicher Subventionen in Europa hat eine bewegte Geschichte: Bis in die 1970er haben viele europäische Staaten ausgiebig Subventionspolitik betrieben, die nach heutigen Regeln kaum möglich gewesen wären. Mit der Vertiefung des europäischen Binnenmarktes gegen Ende der 1980er und Anfang der 1990er wurden zunehmend europäische Normen für die staatliche Beihilfe-politik auf nationaler Ebene durchgesetzt. Diese Studie untersucht insbesondere die Auswirkungen der Ost-Erweiterung der Europäischen Union im Jahr 2004 auf die Unabhängigkeit der Europäischen Beihilfekontrolle. Hierfür werden neben quantitativen auch qualitative Analysen in Form von Case Studies genutzt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass in den vergangenen Jahren ein einheitliches Level Playing Field zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten entstanden ist. Auch der Status des EU Kommissars für Wettbewerb zeigt sich als stark und unabhängig und – bis auf wenige Ausnahmen - weitgehend frei von nationaler Einflussnahm.
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State Aid in the Enlarged European Union: Taking Stock
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, Johannes Stephan
From Global Crisis to Economic Growth. Which Way to Take?, Vol. 1,
2012
Abstract
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) pursued economic restructuring that involved massive injections of state support. With reference to the history of state aids in centrally planned economies we display state aid practices of CEECs since full EU membership and analyse whether their industrial policies during and after transition challenged the European state aid legislation and whether these fit into the EUs strategy of ‘less but better targeted aid’. Therefore, qualitative analysis in case studies is used to supplement a quantitative description of state aid levels in East and West. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. In fact, the most pronounced differences in this respect are not observed between CEECs and the EU-15 but rather between Northern and Southern member states.
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State Aid in the Enlarged European Union. An Overview
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, Johannes Stephan
Abstract
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries pursued economic restructuring of the enterprise sector that involved massive injections of state support. Also foreign investment from the West and facilitation of the development of a market economy involved massive injections of state support. With their accession to the European Union (EU), levels and forms of state aid came under critical review by the European Commission. This inquiry investigates whether the integration of the new member states operates on a level playing field with respect to state aid. Quantitative and qualitative analysis is relied upon to answer this key, as well as other, related questions. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. State aid in the new EU member countries is rather handled more strictly than laxer compared to the ‘old’ EU countries.
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On the Economics of Ex-Post Transfers in a Federal State: A Mechanism Design Approach
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
WWDP, 95,
No. 95,
2008
Abstract
As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.
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