Employment effects of a reduction of continued pay in case of sickness
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Christian Dreger
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
1997
Abstract
Eine Kürzung der Lohnfortsetzung im Krankheitsfall führt zu einem Rückgang der Lohnne-benkosten und damit zu einer Stärkung der Wettbewerbsposition, was – für sich genommen – einen Beschäftigungsaufbau befördert. Eine eingeschränkte Lohnfortzahlung führt jedoch letztlich auch zu einer Verringerung der Nettolohn- und -gehaltssumme und damit der ge-samtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage sowie des Beschäftigungsniveaus. Die komplexen Wirkungen der gegenläufigen Effekte einer Verringerung der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall werden hier mit Hilfe des makroökonometrischen Modells des IWH berechnet. Es wird deutlich, dass die jetzt gesetzlich möglichen Einschränkungen der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall eher gering sind.
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Employment effects of separating uninsured claims from the state pension insurance fund: results of a simulation calculation
Christian Dreger
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 16,
1996
Abstract
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Displacement effects and distorted competition through employment creation programs – The example of horticulture and landscaping business in East Germany
Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
1996
Abstract
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Macroeconomic Employment Effects of CIM Application
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch
CIM: Revolution in Progress. Proceedings of the Finals IIASA Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing: Technologies, Organizations, and People in Transition,
1990
Abstract
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Computer Integrated Manufacturing and Employment: Methodological Problems of Estimating the Employment Effects of CIM Application on the Macroeconomic Level
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch
WP-87-19 (zusammen mit S. Mori und R.U.Ayres),
1987
Abstract
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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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