Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.
Read article
What Drives FDI in Central-eastern Europe? Evidence from the IWH-FDI-Micro Database
Andrea Gauselmann, Mark Knell, Johannes Stephan
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 3,
2011
Abstract
The focus of this paper is on the match between strategic motives of foreign investments into Central-Eastern Europe and locational advantages offered by these countries. Our analysis makes use of the IWH-FDI-Micro Database, a unique dataset that contains information from 2009 about the determinants of locational factors, technological activity of the subsidiaries, and the potentials for knowledge spillovers in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The analysis suggests that investors in these countries are mainly interested in low (unit) labour costs coupled with a well-trained and educated workforce and an expanding market with the high growth rates in the purchasing power of potential buyers. It also suggests that the financial crisis reduced the attractiveness of the region as a source for localised knowledge and technology. There appears to be a match between investors’ expectations and the quantitative supply of unqualified labour, not however for the supply of medium qualified workers. But the analysis suggests that it is not technology-seeking investments that are particularly content with the capabilities of their host economies in terms of technological cooperation. Finally, technological cooperation within the local host economy is assessed more favourably with domestic firms than with local scientific institutions – an important message for domestic economic policy.
Read article
The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany, which is very different from previous recessions, in particular regarding its cause and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts with the best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts during the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is relatively small.
Read article
Fiscal Spending Multiplier Calculations based on Input-Output Tables – with an Application to EU Members
Toralf Pusch, A. Rannberg
Abstract
Fiscal spending multiplier calculations have been revived in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis. Much of the current literature is based on VAR estimation
methods and DSGE models. The aim of this paper is not a further deepening of
this literature but rather to implement a calculation method of multipliers which is
suitable for open economies like EU member states. To this end, Input-Output tables are used as by this means the import intake of domestic demand components can be isolated in order to get an appropriate base for the calculation of the relevant import quotas. The difference of this method is substantial – on average the calculated multipliers are 15% higher than the conventional GDP fiscal spending multiplier for EU members. Multipliers for specific spending categories are comparably high, ranging between 1.4 and 1.8 for many members of the EU. GDP drops due to budget consolidation might therefore be substantial if monetary policy is not able to react in an expansionary manner.
Read article
Die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance deutscher Banken seit 1950
R. H. Schmidt, Felix Noth
Bankhistorisches Archiv,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
The present paper gives an overview of the development of Corporate Governance of German banks since the 1950s. The focus will be on economic analysis. The most striking changes in Corporate Governance occurred with the ownership structure of commercial banks, in particular with the major joint-stock banks. In addition to that, the capital market has become a core element of Corporate Governance in all major German banks, which have replaced their prior concentration on the interests of a broadly defined circle of stakeholders by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, with savings banks and cooperative cooperative banks, Corporate Governance has remained unchanged for the most part. Exceptions to this are the regional state banks: in their case, after they had turned away from traditional business models and in particular following the discontinuation of the guarantee obligation, the problems of their Corporate Governance, which were already discernible beforehand, became quite obvious. If you include the financial crisis, beginning in 2007, in the analysis, it becomes evident that it was precisely a Corporate Governance unilaterally geared to shareholders’ interest and the efficiency of the capital market that materially contributed to the evolution and widening of the crisis.
Read article
The global downturn and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness
Filippo di Mauro, Katrin Forster, Ana Lima
ECB Occasional Paper Series,
No. 119,
2010
Abstract
World trade contracted sharply in late 2008 and early 2009 following the deepening of the financial crisis in September 2008. This paper discusses the main mechanisms behind the global downturn in trade and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness. It finds that the euro area was hit particularly hard by the contraction in global demand.
Read article
Currency Crisis Prediction Using ADR Market Data: An Options-based Approach
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
International Journal of Forecasting,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
During capital control episodes, large price deviations between American Depositary Receipts (ADR) and their underlying stocks signal that a currency crisis is about to occur. We interpret this price spread as the price of a call option. Using option pricing theory we derive detailed information about both the probability of a currency crisis and the expected magnitude of devaluation. Analyzing daily ADR market data preceding the Venezuelan crisis (1996), our approach predicts crisis probabilities of almost 100% and forecasts the exchange rate after floating quite accurately. During the Argentine crisis (2002), the estimated exchange rates are similar to the actual ones.
Read article
Allmähliche Erholung der Wirtschaft Sachsen-Anhalts nach dem Krisenschock
Udo Ludwig, Brigitte Loose, Hardy Gude
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2010
Abstract
Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Sachsen-Anhalt ist im Krisenjahr 2009 mit 4,7% fast so stark gesunken wie im Bundesdurchschnitt. Maßgeblich für den hohen Produktionseinbruch war nicht ein Mangel an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der hiesigen Unternehmen, sondern ein weltweiter Nachfrageschock bei Industriegütern. Er betraf vor allem Hersteller aus der Metall- und Elektroindustrie sowie der Chemischen Industrie. Allerdings mussten in Sachsen-Anhalt auch die beiden weniger auf die Außenmärkte ausgerichteten umsatzstärksten Branchen, nämlich das Ernährungsgewerbe und die Mineralölverarbeitung, im Vergleich mit den anderen Neuen Bundesländern überdurchschnittliche Rückschläge hinnehmen. Hinzu kommt ein Basiseffekt im Baugewerbe: Die Wertschöpfung ließ hier nach einigen Jahren starker Zuwächse überdurchschnittlich nach. Zudem sind die unternehmensbezogenen Dienstleistungen, die im Allgemeinen konjunkturglättend wirken, in Sachsen-Anhalt unterrepräsentiert. Insgesamt konnten die Unternehmen aus Sachsen-Anhalt ihre im vergangenen Aufschwung erarbeitete Wettbewerbsposition im Wesentlichen behaupten. Zwar haben sie den Arbeitsinput nur zögerlich an die niedrigere Produktion angepasst, sodass die Produktivität kräftig gesunken und die Lohnstückkosten entsprechend stark gestiegen sind. Trotzdem blieb ihr preislicher Wettbewerbsvorteil mit 17% gegenüber dem Industriedurchschnitt der Neuen Länder groß. Angetrieben von der florierenden Auslandsnachfrage holt die Wirtschaft Sachsen-Anhalts die Produktionsrückstände seit Mitte 2009 wieder auf. Die Aufwärtsdynamik dürfte in diesem Jahr mit einer Wachstumsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts von 1½% etwa der in den Neuen Ländern insgesamt entsprechen. Aufgrund der hiesigen Wirtschaftsstruktur, die weniger industriell geprägt und weniger exportorientiert ist, wird sie aber hinter der in Deutschland zurückbleiben. Das in der Krise verzehrte Eigenkapital könnte dabei die künftige Entwicklung belasten. Das ist das Ergebnis einer gemeinsamen Prognose des IWH mit dem Verband der Vereine Creditreform.
Read article
Reform der Aufsichtsräte von Banken - Lösung des Problems?
Reint E. Gropp, M. Köhler
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen,
No. 14,
2010
Abstract
Nicht nur die Regulatoren, sondern auch die große Mehrheit der Bankpraktiker gibt den Aufsichts- und Verwaltungsräten der Institute eine Mitschuld an der Finanzkrise und befürwortet Strukturänderungen in den Kontrollgremien. Der als sinnvoll erachtete Maßnahmenkatalog reicht von einer Begrenzung der Mandate über eine erfolgsabhängige Entlohnung bis hin zu verstärkten Informationsrechten gegenüber dem Vorstand. Nach Ansicht der Autoren setzen diese Vorschläge ebenso wie die Initiativen der Aufseher an den richtigen Stellen an. In Bezug auf die Abhängigkeit des Aufsichtsrats von den Aktionären und seiner stärkeren Ausrichtung auf die Nachhaltigkeit der Geschäftsstrategie sehen sie aber noch Nachbesserungsbedarf.
Read article
The Role of Rating Agencies in Financial Crises: Event Studies from the Asian Flu
Makram El-Shagi
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
2010
Abstract
Based on case studies from countries that have been hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the present paper shows that the accusation that sovereign ratings led to a severe acceleration of the crisis is unconvincing and that the empirical method often used to support accusations against rating agencies is inappropriate for the problem under analysis. Rather, it must be emphasised that ratings were downgraded in most countries very shortly before the end of the crisis. In some countries, the ratings were even further downgraded after the end of the crisis as countries started to recover. This is not in line with the thesis that the crisis was accelerated by rating agencies.
Read article
