Deriving the Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk with a Compound Option Approach: The Case of Kazakhstan
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Discussion paper, Series 2: Banking and financial studies, No. 01/2010,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term default risk to each maturity. Applying the Duan (1994) maximum likelihood approach, we find for Kazakhstan that the overall crisis probability was mainly driven by short-term risk, which increased from 25% in March 2007 to 80% in December 2008. Concurrently, the long-term default risk increased from 20% to only 25% during the same period.
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Organization and Financing of Innovation, and the Choice between Corporate and Independent Venture Capital
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of competition on the optimal organization and financing structures in innovation-intensive industries. We show that as an optimal response to competition, firms may choose external organization structures established in collaboration with specialized start-ups where they provide start-up financing from their own resources. As the intensity of the competition to innovate increases, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry. We also show that as the level of competition increases, firms provide a higher level of financing for externally organized projects in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Our results help explain the emergence of organization and financing arrangements such as CVC and strategic alliances, where large established firms organize their projects in collaboration with external specialized firms and provide financing for externally organized projects from their own internal resources.
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Regional Growth and Finance in Europe: Is there a Quality Effect of Bank Efficiency?
Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency estimates as quality measures of financial institutions. Contrary to the usual quantitative proxies of financial development, the quality of financial institutions is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth then an identical increase in credit does. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an independent growth effect in addition to direct quantity and quality channel effects.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition
Hans Degryse, Luc Laeven, Steven Ongena
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.
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Cross-Border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
We analyze cross-border contagion among European banks in the period from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate, in a given country, the number of banks that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances”) as a function of common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in distance to default of banks.We find evidence of significant cross-border contagion among large European banks, which is consistent with a tiered cross-border interbank structure. The results also suggest that contagion increased after the introduction of the euro.
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Contestability, Technology and Banking
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 09-007,
No. 7,
2009
Abstract
We estimate the effect of internet penetration on retail bank margins in the euro area. Based on an adapted Baumol [1982] type contestability model, we argue that the internet has reduced sunk costs and therefore increased contestability in retail banking. We test this conjecture by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data for a panel of euro area countries. We utilise time series and cross-sectional variation in internet penetration. We find support for an increase in contestability in deposit markets, and no effect for loan markets. The paper suggests that for time and savings deposits, the presence of brick and mortar bank branches may no longer be of first order importance for the assessment of the competitive structure of the market.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Foreign Subsidiaries in the East German Innovation System – Evidence from Manufacturing Industries
Jutta Günther, Björn Jindra, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses the extent of technological capability of foreign subsidiaries located in East Germany, and looks at the determinants of foreign subsidiaries’ technological sourcing behaviour. The theory of international production underlines the importance of strategic and regional level variables. However, existing empirical approaches omit by and large regional level factors. We employ survey evidence from the “FDI micro data- base” of the IWH, that was only recently made available, to conduct our analyses. We find that foreign subsidiaries are above average technologically active in comparison to the whole East German manufacturing. This can be partially explained by the industrial structure of foreign direct investment. However, only a limited share of foreign subsidiaries with R&D and/or innovation activity source technological knowledge from the East German innovation system. If a subsidiary follows a competence augmenting strategy or does local trade, it is more likely to source technological knowledge locally. The endowment of a region with human capital and a scientific infrastructure has a positive effect too. The findings suggest that foreign subsidiaries in East Germany are only partially linked with the regional innovation system. Policy implications are discussed.
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Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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