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09.09.2015 • 34/2015

Interest Benefits from the Debt Crisis to the German Budget: Updated Calculations

In an updated calculation, IWH researchers could provide further evidence that interest benefits to the German budget arise indeed also from the “flight-to-safety-effect” and are not just effects from the low interest environment more generally. With a refined methodology they obtain interest savings to the German budget of just under 90 billion Euro.

Reint E. Gropp
Oliver Holtemöller
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Interest Benefits from the Debt Crisis to the German Budget: Updated Calculations

IWH Online, No. 8, 2015
Abstract
In a recent IWH online note, the IWH suggested that due to “flight to safety” effects, Germany was able to issue government debt at lower rates than otherwise would have been possible. The total savings was calculated to be around Euro 100 billion or about 3 percent of German GDP. This note provides further evidence on the interest savings to the German budget that extend the calculations in two dimensions. Using this refined methodology, we obtain interest savings to the German budget of just under Euro 90 billion.
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Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison

Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 13, 2015
published in: Applied Economics Letters
Abstract
Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk. We investigate four proxies for bank risk that are frequently used in the literature. Our analysis shows that non-performing assets are a good proxy for bank risk for two reasons. First, non-performing assets nest the alternative proxies as shown by the high share of variation in non-performing assets explained by the Z-score, loan loss reserves and loan loss provisions. Second, non-performing assets are well-suited to explain bank failures one year ahead. The latter point also holds for the Z-score whereby the information content of the Z-score seems to differ from the other variables. We conclude that non-performing assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score, which may come with calculation issues regarding the volatility of profitability, in studies of bank risk.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View

Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 12, 2015
published in: Journal of Financial Stability
Abstract
We identify the determinants of all German banks’ sovereign debt exposures between 2005 and 2013 and test for the implications of these exposures for bank risk. Larger, more capital market affine, and less capitalised banks hold more sovereign bonds. Around 15% of all German banks never hold sovereign bonds during the sample period. The sensitivity of sovereign bond holdings by banks to eurozone membership and inflation increased significantly since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, banks prefer sovereigns with lower debt ratios and lower bond yields. Finally, we find that riskiness of government bond holdings affects bank risk only since 2010. This confirms the existence of a nexus between government debt and bank risk.
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Bank Market Power, Factor Reallocation, and Aggregate Growth

R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Journal of Financial Stability, 2015
Abstract
Using a unique firm-level sample of approximately 700,000 firm-year observations of German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this study seeks to identify the effect of bank market power on aggregate growth components. We test for a pre-crisis sample whether bank market power spurs or hinders the reallocation of resources across informationally opaque firms. Identification relies on the dependence on external finance in each industry and the regional demarcation of regional banking markets in Germany. The results show that bank markups spur aggregate SME growth, primarily through technical change and the reallocation of resources. Banks seem to need sufficient markups to generate the necessary private information to allocate financial funds efficiently.
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10.08.2015 • 30/2015

Germany Benefited Substantially from the Greek Crisis

The balanced budget in Germany is largely the result of lower interest payments due to the European debt crisis. Research from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows that the debt crisis resulted in a reduction in German bund rates of about 300 basis points (BP), yielding interest savings of more than EUR 100 billion (or more than 3% of gross domestic product, GDP) during the period 2010 to 2015. A significant part of this reduction is directly attributable to the Greek crisis. When discussing the costs to the German tax payer of saving Greece, these benefits should not be overlooked, as they tend to be larger than the expenses, even in a scenario where Greece does not repay any of its debts.

Reint E. Gropp
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Germany’s Benefit from the Greek Crisis

IWH Online, No. 7, 2015
Abstract
This note shows that the German public sector balance benefited significantly from the European/Greek debt crisis, because of lower interest payments on public sector debt. This is due to two effects: One, in crisis times investors disproportionately seek out safe investments (“flight to safety“), bidding down the returns on safe-haven assets. We show that German bunds strongly benefited from this effect during the Greek debt crisis. Second, while the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy stance was quite close to an “optimal“ monetary policy stance for Germany from 1999 to 2007, during the crisis monetary policy was too accommodating from a German perspective, due to the emerging disparities across the Euro area. As a result of these two effects, our calculations suggest that the German sovereign saved more than 100 billion Euros in interest expenses between 2010 and mid-2015. That is, Germany benefited from the Greek crisis even in case that Greece defaults on all its debt (a total of 90 billions) owed to the German government via diverse channels (European Stability Mechanism [ESM], International Monetary Fund [IMF], or directly).
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EFN Report Summer 2015: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 3, 2015
Abstract
External conditions for the euro area economy are still favourable, albeit somewhat less so than at the beginning of the year. Oil prices are by more than a third lower than they were on average in 2014, but about 10 USD higher than in January. Long term interest rates are still very low, but by half a percentage point higher than in January. Worldwide growth in production and trade has disappointed in the first quarter of 2015, and recent leading indicators point to no more than a slightly faster expansion of world production for the rest of the year. The risks of contagion from the Greek crisis to the partner countries appear limited, because financial exposure to the Greek banking sector has been very much reduced. The EU nowadays has instruments with considerable power to fight losses of confidence, and the other countries that received financial assistance in the euro crisis appear politically much more stable, and their economies (including that of Cyprus in the first quarter of this year) have started growing at quite satisfactory rates. According to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.6% in 2015 and by 2.1% in 2016, as negative factors slowly become less important. Both private consumption and investment will expand at a good pace, and the unemployment rate will diminish, but still remain above 10% by the end of 2016. The main risk is that the Greek crisis has a more negative effect on confidence than initially expected. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.2%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. During the first quarter of 2015 rising oil prices were the main contributors to the ascending inflation expectations, while during the second quarter upward surprises over expected inflation have come from manufactured goods and services. For 2016, we expect that inflation will increase up to 1.2%, still below the 2% ECB’s target.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency

Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 7, 2015
published in: Journal of Monetary Economics
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Optimizing Policymakers' Loss Functions in Crisis Prediction: Before, Within or After?

Peter Sarlin, Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 6, 2015
published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics
Abstract
Early-warning models most commonly optimize signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities. The ex-post threshold optimization is based upon a loss function accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but comes with two crucial drawbacks: unstable thresholds in recursive estimations and an in-sample overfit at the expense of out-of-sample performance. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. We provide simulated and real-world evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds and improves out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.
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