The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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The Distance Puzzle: On the Interpretation of the Distance Coefficient in Gravity Equations
Claudia M. Buch, J. Kleinert, Farid Toubal
Economics Letters,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
Although globalization has diminished the importance of distance, empirical gravity models find little change in distance coefficients. We argue that changing distance costs are largely reflected in the constant term. A proportional fall in distance costs is consistent with constant distance coefficients.
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Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?
Claudia M. Buch
Journal of Money Credit,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones. Using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks, I empirically determine the impact of information, costs and regulations, and I isolate intra-EU financial linkages. I confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks, but their relative importance differs among countries.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Unit labor costs and competitiveness - a micro econometric analysis for East Germany
Harald Lehmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 180,
2003
Abstract
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Ostdeutschland hängt neben der Gründung neuer Unternehmen und der Attraktion auswärtiger Investitionen vor allem davon ab, wie es den bestehenden Unternehmen gelingt, ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu steigern bzw. auf einem hohen Niveau zu halten. Wettbewerbsfähige Betriebe sind auch immer rentable Betriebe. Sie sind in der Lage Eigenkapital aufzubauen, was eine wichtige Voraussetzung fur die Finanzierung von Innovationen und Investitionen, aber auch für eine gewisse Krisenfestigkeit ist. Damit tragen sie erheblich zum gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wachstum und zu höherer Beschäftigung bei.
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A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 275,
2002
Abstract
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.
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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
No. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
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Fiscal costs of employment creating schemes - a case study
Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2002
Abstract
Die Teilnahme an einer Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM) verschlechtert bekanntermaßen die Beschäftigungschancen im regulären Arbeitsmarkt im Vergleich zur Nichtteilnahme. Dadurch kommt es nicht nur während der Durchführung der Maßnahme zu höheren fiskalischen Kosten im Vergleich zur Arbeitslosigkeit, sondern auch im Anschluss daran sind mehr öffentliche Mittel notwendig, um die im Durchschnitt verlängerte Arbeitslosigkeit zu finanzieren. In diesem Kontext konnten für ein Fallbeispiel Mehrkosten in Höhe von etwa 26 500 Euro ermittelt werden. Davon sind allein mehr als 60% Nachfolgekosten der Maßnahmenteilnahme. Sollte hingegen eine Maßnahme aus fiskalischer Sicht kostenneutral sein, so müsste sie die Arbeitslosigkeit im Fallbeispiel um 9,2 Monate verkürzen. Dies dürfte jedoch schwer zu erreichen sein, da während der ABM-Teilnahme kaum Übergänge in eine reguläre Beschäftigung zu beobachten sind, jedoch im Referenzszenario der Nichtteilnahme die Abgänge aus Arbeitslosigkeit in Beschäftigung in diesem Zeitraum relativ hoch sind. Eine strengere Ausrichtung auf Zielgruppen könnte hierbei möglicherweise Abhilfe schaffen.
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Long term appointment of central bankers: Costs and benefits
Axel Lindner
European Journal of Political Economy,
No. 4,
2000
Abstract
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The sectoral development of East Germany's economy in view of the European system of macroeconomic accounting
Brigitte Loose, Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Udo Ludwig
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2000
Abstract
Es werden die sektoralen Entstehungskomponenten des Bruttoinlandsprodukts für Ostdeutschland im Zeitraum von 1991 bis 1999 nach der Umstellung auf das Europäische System Volkswirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnungen analysiert. Für die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft ergibt sich ein völlig neues strukturelles Erscheinungsbild, das ausführlich begründet wird. Herausgearbeitet werden dabei vor allem der Wechsel zwischen den sektoralen Antriebskräften sowie die Entwicklung von Produktivität und Lohnstückkosten nach Wirtschaftsbereichen.
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