Can Lenders Discern Managerial Ability from Luck? Evidence from Bank Loan Contracts
Dien Giau Bui, Yan-Shing Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2018
Abstract
We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
Read article
Regional, Individual and Political Determinants of FOMC Members' Key Macroeconomic Forecasts
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Journal of Forecasting,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
We study Federal Open Market Committee members' individual forecasts of inflation and unemployment in the period 1992–2004. Our results imply that Governors and Bank presidents forecast differently, with Governors submitting lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts than bank presidents. For Bank presidents we find a regional bias, with higher district unemployment rates being associated with lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts. Bank presidents' regional bias is more pronounced during the year prior to their elections or for nonvoting bank presidents. Career backgrounds or political affiliations also affect individual forecast behavior.
Read article
When Arm’s Length is too Far: Relationship Banking over the Credit Cycle
Thorsten Beck, Hans Degryse, Ralph De Haas, Neeltje van Horen
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
We conduct face-to-face interviews with bank CEOs to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders. We then use the geographic coordinates of these banks’ branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom, it alleviates such constraints during a downturn. This positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn. Moreover, our evidence suggests that relationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans.
Read article
Does It Pay to Get Connected? An Examination of Bank Alliance Network and Bond Spread
Iftekhar Hasan, Céline Meslier, Amine Tarazi, Mingming Zhou
Journal of Economics and Business,
forthcoming
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of bank alliance network on bonds issued by European banks during the period 1990–2009. We construct six measures capturing different dimensions of banks’ network characteristics. In opposition to the results obtained for non-financial firms, our findings indicate that being part of a network does not create value for bank’s bondholders, indicating a dark side effect of strategic alliances in the banking sector. While being part of a network is perceived as a risk-increasing event by market participants, this negative perception is significantly lower for the larger banks, and, to a lesser extent, for the more profitable banks. Moreover, during crisis times, the positive impact on bond spread of a bank’s higher centrality or of a bank’s higher connectedness in the network is stronger, indicating that market participants may fear spillover effects within the network during periods of banks’ heightened financial fragility.
Read article
Too connected to fail? Wie die Vernetzung der Banken staatliche
Rettungsmaßnahmen vorhersagen kann
Friederike Altgelt, Michael Koetter
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Seit der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/2008 liegt aufgrund ihrer Schlüsselrolle für ein funktionierendes Finanzsystem ein besonderer Fokus auf den so genannten systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen (systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs). Neben der Größe von Finanzinstitutionen ist auch das Ausmaß ihrer Vernetzung im internationalen Finanzsystem entscheidend für die Klassifikation als systemrelevant. Obwohl die Vernetzung von Banken untereinander in der Regel schwer zu messen ist, kann sie aus der Entwicklung von Prämien von Kreditausfallversicherungen (den so genannten Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spreads) und Aktienrenditen abgeleitet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit sich mit Hilfe der sich daraus ergebenden Co-Crash-Probability vor der Finanzkrise vorhersagen lässt, welche Finanzinstitutionen während der Krise Teil von staatlichen Rettungsprogrammen (bailout programmes) wurden.
Read article
Aktuelle Trends: Große deutsche Banken werden kleiner und haben
mehr Eigenkapital
Lena Tonzer, Talina Sondershaus
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Große Banken profitieren in der Regel von einem „Toobig- to-fail“-Status: Sie sind „zu groß, um zu scheitern“. Vor der letzten Finanzkrise, die im Jahr 2007 begann, haben die Vermögenswerte der großen Banken in Deutschland durchschnittlich zugenommen. Je größer der Marktanteil und die Vernetzung großer Banken, desto größer sind die systemischen Auswirkungen, falls eine Bank in Schieflage gerät. Aus Angst vor einem systemischen Zusammenbruch werden deshalb oft staatliche Garantien ausgesprochen oder Eigenkapital bereitgestellt. Wenn große Banken die Rettung durch den Staat antizipieren, kann das dazu führen, dass sie riskantere Geschäfte eingehen. Diese Problematik kam in der letzten Krise zum Tragen, sodass zahlreiche regulatorische Änderungen beschlossen wurden, um das systemische Risiko großer Banken zu reduzieren.
Read article
Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
Read article
Politically Connected Firms in Poland and Their Access to Bank Financing
Iftekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Oskar Kowalewski, Łukasz Kozłowski
Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
This paper characterizes politically connected firms and their access to bank financing. We determine that the relationship between political connections and access to long-term bank loans is weaker in Poland than in other emerging economies. The most probable explanation for this result is related to the instability of the political climate in Poland. We find that only certain kinds of political connections, such as recent connections, positively influenced access to bank financing during the sample period from 2001 to 2011. Moreover, we obtain also some evidence that the value of political connections increased during the 2007 crisis period and onward.
Read article
Bank Financing, Institutions and Regional Entrepreneurial Activities: Evidence from China
Iftekhar Hasan, Nada Kobeissi, Haizhi Wang, Mingming Zhou
International Review of Economics and Finance,
November
2017
Abstract
We investigate the effects of bank financing on regional entrepreneurial activities in China. We present contrasting findings on the role of quantity vs. quality of bank financing on small business formation in China: while we document a consistent, significantly positive relationship between the quality of bank financing and new venture formation, we find that the quantity of supplied credit is insignificant. We report that formal institutions are positively correlated to regional entrepreneurial activities, and informal institutions substitute formal institutions. Our findings also reveal that the institutional environment tends to supplement bank financing in promoting regional entrepreneurial activities.
Read article
Central Bank Transparency and the Volatility of Exchange Rates
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke
Abstract
We analyze the effect of monetary policy transparency on bilateral exchange rate volatility. We test the theoretical predictions of a stylized model using panel data for 62 currencies from 1998 to 2010. We find strong empirical evidence that an increase in the availability of information about monetary policy objectives decreases exchange rate volatility. Using interaction models, we find that this effect is more pronounced for countries with a lower flexibility of goods prices, a lower level of central bank conservatism, and a higher interest rate sensitivity of money demand.
Read article
