The Total Cost of Trading Belgian Shares: Brussels versus London
Hans Degryse
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
1999
Abstract
Since 1990, London’s SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) has attracted considerable trading volume in Belgian equities. This paper investigates competition between the Brussels CATS market and London’s SEAQ-I. Toward this end, we gathered extensive limit order book data as well as transactions and quotation information. With regard to liquidity (indirect costs), measured by the quoted and effective bid–ask spread, the paper concludes that CATS outperforms SEAQ International for both measures. The effective spread is of course substantially smaller than the quoted spread, with the CATS effective spread showing a U-shaped form. This paper, unique in employing an extensive data set that includes all hidden orders and the whole limit order book, produces results in line with the different market microstructure models. Total trading costs on CATS are lower (higher) for small (large) trade sizes.
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Employment effects of a reduction of continued pay in case of sickness
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Christian Dreger
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
1997
Abstract
Eine Kürzung der Lohnfortsetzung im Krankheitsfall führt zu einem Rückgang der Lohnne-benkosten und damit zu einer Stärkung der Wettbewerbsposition, was – für sich genommen – einen Beschäftigungsaufbau befördert. Eine eingeschränkte Lohnfortzahlung führt jedoch letztlich auch zu einer Verringerung der Nettolohn- und -gehaltssumme und damit der ge-samtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage sowie des Beschäftigungsniveaus. Die komplexen Wirkungen der gegenläufigen Effekte einer Verringerung der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall werden hier mit Hilfe des makroökonometrischen Modells des IWH berechnet. Es wird deutlich, dass die jetzt gesetzlich möglichen Einschränkungen der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall eher gering sind.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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Corporate Taxation and Capital Structure Choice in Germany: A General Equilibrium Model
Reint E. Gropp
FinanzArchiv,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
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