Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Carlo Wix
Abstract
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and its transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise provides an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment, which allows us to identify the effect of higher capital requirements using a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. We also show that this reduction in credit supply results in lower firm-, investment-, and sales growth for firms which obtain a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
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Creative Destruction and Subjective Well-being
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Angus Deaton, Alexandra Roulet
American Economic Review,
No. 12,
2016
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the relationship between turnover-driven growth and subjective well-being. Our model of innovation-led growth and unemployment predicts that: (i) the effect of creative destruction on expected individual welfare should be unambiguously positive if we control for unemployment, less so if we do not; (ii) job creation has a positive and job destruction has a negative impact on well-being; (iii) job destruction has a less negative impact in areas with more generous unemployment insurance policies; and (iv) job creation has a more positive effect on individuals that are more forward-looking. The empirical analysis using cross sectional MSA (metropolitan statistical area)-level and individual-level data provide empirical support to these predictions.
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A Fresh Look at the Labor Market Height Premium in Germany
Frieder Kropfhäußer
Economics Bulletin,
No. 3,
2016
Abstract
I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) to analyze the relationship between height and wages in a sample of young German workers. My results show that the crude height wage premium documented in the literature is explained by unobserved heterogeneity on the sibling level. This contradicts the findings of a labor market height premium in Germany using OLS and Hausman-Taylor estimators as well as the Swedish finding of a height effect remaining after controlling for sibling fixed effects.
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The Operational Consequences of Private Equity Buyouts: Evidence From the Restaurant Industry
Shai B. Bernstein, Albert Sheen
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 9,
2016
Abstract
How do private equity firms affect their portfolio companies? We document operational changes in restaurant chain buyouts using comprehensive health inspection records. Store-level operational practices improve after private equity buyout, as restaurants become cleaner, safer, and better maintained. Supporting a causal interpretation, this effect is stronger in chain-owned stores than in franchised locations—“twin” restaurants over which private equity owners have limited control. These changes are particularly apparent when private equity partners have prior industry experience. The results suggest that by bringing in industry expertise, private equity firms improve firm operations.
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European Firms after the Crisis – New Insights from the 5th Vintage of the CompNet Firm-level-based Database
Elena Ashtari Tafti, Richard Bräuer, Sante De Pinto, Marco Grazioli, Matthias Mertens, Daniel Stöhlker, Marta Tagliabue
,
2016
Abstract
This report intends to shed light on the competitive stance of European firms after the crisis. In line with CompNet cutting-edge approach, we take a firm-level perspective to analyse the competitive position of European firms by drawing from the new vintage of the firm-level-based CompNet database. This micro-level approach allows us to ascertain the extent in which firms performances are heterogeneous across EU, also in relation of possible determinants of such performance.
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Plant-level Employment Development before Collective Displacements: Comparing Mass Layoffs, Plant Closures, and Bankruptcies
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
To assess to what extent collective job displacements can be regarded as unanticipated exogenous shocks for affected employees, we analyze plant-level employment patterns before bankruptcy, plant closure without bankruptcy, and mass layoff. Utilizing administrative data covering all West German private sector plants, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcy. Our analysis of worker flows underlines that bankruptcies seem to struggle for survival while closures follow a shrinking strategy. We conclude that the scope of worker anticipation of upcoming job loss is smallest for mass layoffs and largest for closures without bankruptcy.
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Lend Global, Fund Local? Price and Funding Cost Margins in Multinational Banking
Rients Galema, Michael Koetter, C. Liesegang
Review of Finance,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
In a proposed model of a multinational bank, interest margins determine local lending by foreign affiliates and the internal funding by parent banks. We exploit detailed parent-affiliate-level data of all German banks to empirically test our theoretical predictions in pre-crisis times. Local lending by affiliates depends negatively on price margins, the difference between lending and deposit rates in foreign markets. The effect of funding cost margins, the gap between local deposit rates faced by affiliates abroad and the funding costs of their parents, on internal capital market funding is positive but statistically weak. Interest margins are central to explain the interaction between internal capital markets and foreign affiliates lending.
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The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Informal or Formal Financing? Evidence on the Co-Funding of Chinese Firms
Hans Degryse, Liping Lu, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
2016
Abstract
Different modes of external finance provide heterogeneous benefits for the borrowing firms. Informal finance offers informational advantages whereas formal finance is scalable. Using unique survey data from China, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms but lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Co-funding, thereby simultaneously using the informational advantage of informal finance and the scalability of formal finance, is therefore the optimal choice for small firms.
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