Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Julia Cagé, William R. Kerr
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
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CEO Political Preference and Corporate Tax Sheltering
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun, Qiang Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2016
Abstract
We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs' tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
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Declining Business Dynamism: What We Know and the Way Forward
Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Javier Miranda
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
A growing body of evidence indicates that the U.S. economy has become less dynamic in recent years. This trend is evident in declining rates of gross job and worker flows as well as declining rates of entrepreneurship and young firm activity, and the trend is pervasive across industries, regions, and firm size classes. We describe the evidence on these changes in the U.S. economy by reviewing existing research. We then describe new empirical facts about the relationship between establishment-level productivity and employment growth, framing our results in terms of canonical models of firm dynamics and suggesting empirically testable potential explanations.
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Multidimensional Well-being and Regional Disparities in Europe
Jörg Döpke, A. Knabe, Cornelia Lang, Philip Maschke
Abstract
Using data from the OECD Regional Well-Being Index – a set of quality-of-life indicators measured at the sub-national level, we construct a set of composite well-being indices. We analyse the extent to which the choice of five alternative aggregation methods affects the well-being ranking of regions. We find that regional inequality in these composite measures is lower than regional inequality in gross-domestic product (GDP) per capita. For most aggregation methods, the rank correlation across regions appears to be quite high. It is also shown that using alternative indicators instead of GDP per capita would only have a small effect on the set of regions eligible for aid from EU Structural Funds. The exception appears to be an aggregation based on how individual dimensions of welfare relate to average life satisfaction across regions, which would substantially change both the ranking of regions and which regions would receive EU funds.
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Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States
Viktor Slavtchev, Simon Wiederhold
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates the role of the technological content of government procurement in innovation. In a theoretical model, we first show that a shift in the composition of public purchases toward high-tech products translates into higher economy-wide returns to innovation, leading to an increase in the aggregate level of private R&D. Using unique data on federal procurement in US states and performing panel fixed-effects estimations, we find support for the model's prediction of a positive R&D effect of the technological content of government procurement. Instrumental-variable estimations suggest a causal interpretation of our findings.
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Asymmetric Investment Responses to Firm-specific Uncertainty
Julian Berner, Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper analyzes how firm-specific uncertainty affects firms’ propensity to invest. We measure firm-specific uncertainty as firms’ absolute forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011. In line with the literature, our empirical findings reveal a negative impact of firm-specific uncertainty on investment. However, further results show that the investment response is asymmetric, depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines significantly if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust their investment if the realized situation is better than expected, which suggests that the uncertainty effect counteracts the positive effect due to unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This can be one explanation behind the phenomenon of slow recovery in the aftermath of financial crises. Additional results show that the forecast error is highly concurrent with an ex-ante measure of firm-specific uncertainty we obtain from the survey data. Furthermore, the effect of firm-specific uncertainty is enforced for firms that face a tighter financing situation.
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Size of Training Firms and Cumulated Long-run Unemployment Exposure – The Role of Firms, Luck, and Ability in Young Workers’ Careers
Steffen Müller, Renate Neubäumer
Abstract
This paper analyzes how life-cycle unemployment of former apprentices depends on the size of the training firm. We start from the hypotheses that the size of training firms reduces long-run cumulated unemployment exposure, e.g. via differences in training quality and in the availability of internal labor markets, and that the access to large training firms depends positively on young workers’ ability and their luck to live in a region with many large and medium-sized training firms. We test these hypotheses empirically by using a large administrative data set for Germany and find corroborative evidence.
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A Market-based Indicator of Currency Risk: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts
Stefan Eichler, Ingmar Roevekamp
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
We introduce a novel currency risk measure based on American Depositary Receipts(ADRs). Using a multifactor pricing model, we exploit ADR investors’ exposure to potential devaluation losses to derive an indicator of currency risk. Using weekly data for a sample of 831 ADRs located in 23 emerging markets over the 1994-2014 period, we find that a deterioration in the fiscal and current account balance, as well as higher inflation, increases currency risk. Interaction models reveal that these macroeconomic fundamentals drive currency risk, particularly in countries with managed exchange rates, low levels of foreign exchange reserves and a poor sovereign credit rating.
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