A glimpse on sectoral convergence of productivity levels
Gerald Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 133,
2001
Abstract
This paper examines the presence of sectoral convergence of labor productivity between 14 OECD countries. Using the OECD International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB), the paper looks at the developments within 12 distinct sectors during the period 1970-1995. The change of the coefficients of variance suggests that there is strong sectoral convergence within most service sectors while the evidence of convergence for Manufacturing as well as for Communication is rather weak. These findings are in line with most studies undertaken on this subject so far. It is concluded that economic theories at hand to explain growth and convergence (or divergence respectively) are of different importance for the sectors concerned. While models of the New Growth Theory seemed to be useful to explain growth mechanisms within Manufacturing and Communication, traditional models seemed to apply to most other sectors.
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Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-Expert
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a 'timid-pricing' equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an 'aggressive-pricing' equilibrium pops up. For intermediate values of the non-expert's successful repair a 'mixed-pricing' equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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