European Firm Concentration and Aggregate Productivity
Tommaso Bighelli, Filippo di Mauro, Marc Melitz, Matthias Mertens
Abstract
This article derives a European Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity towards large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from reallocation accounted for 50% of European productivity growth and markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
Read article
Importwettbewerb und Firmenproduktivität
Viktor Slavtchev
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Dieser Beitrag untersucht für Unternehmen aus dem Verarbeitenden Gewerbe in Deutschland empirisch, ob der Wettbewerbsdruck durch Importe zu einer Steigerung der Produktivität führt. Um die Reaktionen der einheimischen Unternehmen besser zu verstehen, werden auch Effekte auf Output, Beschäftigung und FuE-Aktivitäten der Unternehmen analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Anreize der Unternehmen, in eine Erhöhung ihrer Produktivität zu „investieren“, von der Art der importierten Güter abhängen sowie davon, wie schwierig es für die einheimischen Unternehmen ist, mit der Konkurrenz mitzuhalten. Auf Importe von vergleichsweise technologisch einfachen und arbeitsintensiven Produkten aus Niedriglohnländern reagieren einheimische Unternehmen nicht mit einer Erhöhung ihrer Produktivität; vielmehr reduzieren sie Output und Beschäftigung. Dagegen steigt die Produktivität einheimischer Unternehmen als Reaktion auf Wettbewerbsdruck durch Importe von kapital- und technologieintensiven Gütern aus Industrieländern – jedoch nicht aufgrund höherer FuE-Ausgaben; ein Rückgang von Output und Beschäftigung ist in diesem Fall nicht beobachtbar.
Read article
Changing Business Dynamism and Productivity: Shocks versus Responsiveness
Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Javier Miranda
American Economic Review,
No. 12,
2020
Abstract
The pace of job reallocation has declined in the United States in recent decades. We draw insight from canonical models of business dynamics in which reallocation can decline due to (i) lower dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks faced by businesses, or (ii) weaker marginal responsiveness of businesses to shocks. We show that shock dispersion has actually risen, while the responsiveness of business-level employment to productivity has weakened. Moreover, declining responsiveness can account for a significant fraction of the decline in the pace of job reallocation, and we find suggestive evidence this has been a drag on aggregate productivity.
Read article
On the International Dissemination of Technology News Shocks
João Carlos Claudio, Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the propagation of technology news shocks within and across industrialised economies. We construct quarterly utilisation-adjusted total factor productivity (TFP) for thirteen OECD countries. Based on country-specific structural vector autoregressions (VARs), we document that (i) the identified technology news shocks induce a quite homogeneous response pattern of key macroeconomic variables in each country; and (ii) the identified technology news shock processes display a significant degree of correlation across several countries. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that the US are only one of many different sources of technological innovations diffusing across advanced economies. Technology news propagate through the endogenous reaction of monetary policy and via trade-related variables. That is, our results imply that financial markets and trade are key channels for the dissemination of technology.
Read article
Wages and the Value of Nonemployment
Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer, Samuel Young, Josef Zweimüller
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than $0.01 per $1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than $0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of $0.24–$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.
Read article
Growing Income Inequality in the United States and Other Advanced Economies
Florian Hoffmann, David S. Lee, Thomas Lemieux
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
This paper studies the contribution of both labor and non-labor income in the growth in income inequality in the United States and large European economies. The paper first shows that the capital to labor income ratio disproportionately increased among high-earnings individuals, further contributing to the growth in overall income inequality. That said, the magnitude of this effect is modest, and the predominant driver of the growth in income inequality in recent decades is the growth in labor earnings inequality. Far more important than the distinction between total income and labor income, is the way in which educational factors account for the growth in US labor and capital income inequality. Growing income gaps among different education groups as well as composition effects linked to a growing fraction of highly educated workers have been driving these effects, with a noticeable role of occupational and locational factors for women. Findings for large European economies indicate that inequality has been growing fast in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, though not in France. Capital income and education don't play as much as a role in these countries as in the United States.
Read article
Employment Effects of Introducing a Minimum Wage: The Case of Germany
Oliver Holtemöller, Felix Pohle
Economic Modelling,
July
2020
Abstract
Income inequality has been a major concern of economic policy makers for several years. Can minimum wages help to mitigate inequality? In 2015, the German government introduced a nationwide statutory minimum wage to reduce income inequality by improving the labour income of low-wage employees. However, the employment effects of wage increases depend on time and region specific conditions and, hence, they cannot be known in advance. Because negative employment effects may offset the income gains for low-wage employees, it is important to evaluate minimum-wage policies empirically. We estimate the employment effects of the German minimum-wage introduction using panel regressions on the state-industry-level. We find a robust negative effect of the minimum wage on marginal and a robust positive effect on regular employment. In terms of the number of jobs, our results imply a negative overall effect. Hence, low-wage employees who are still employed are better off at the expense of those who have lost their jobs due to the minimum wage.
Read article
The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
Read article
Economy in Shock — Financial Policy is Holding Up
Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Claus Michelsen, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
Nach Ansicht der führenden deutschen Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute bricht die Konjunktur in Deutschland als Folge der Corona-Pandemie drastisch ein. Um die Infektionswelle abzubremsen, hat der Staat die wirtschaftliche Aktivität hierzulande stark eingeschränkt. Deshalb dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2020 um 4,2 % schrumpfen. Die Rezession hinterlässt deutliche Spuren auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und im Staatshaushalt. In der Spitze wird die Arbeitslosenquote auf 5,9 % und die Zahl der Kurzarbeiter auf 2,4 Mio. hochschnellen. Die finanzpolitischen Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen führen 2020 zu einem Rekorddefizit im gesamtstaatlichen Haushalt von 159 Mrd. Euro. Nach dem Shutdown wird sich die Konjunktur schrittweise erholen. Entsprechend fällt der Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts 2021 mit 5,8 % kräftig aus. Mit dieser Prognose sind erhebliche Abwärtsrisiken verbunden, etwa weil sich die Pandemie deutlich langsamer abschwächen lässt, oder weil das Wiederhochfahren der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität schlechter gelingt als angenommen bzw. eine erneute Ansteckungswelle auslöst.
Read article
08.04.2020 • 5/2020
Economy in Shock – Fiscal Policy to Counteract
The coronavirus pandemic is triggering a severe recession in Germany. Economic output will shrink by 4.2% this year. This is what the leading economics research institutes expect in their spring report. For next year, they are forecasting a recovery and growth of 5.8%.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read
