On DSGE Models
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum, Mathias Trabandt
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.
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28.09.2017 • 36/2017
Aufschwung im Osten so stark wie in Deutschland insgesamt – Implikationen der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2017 für Ostdeutschland
Für das Jahr 2017 prognostiziert das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) einen Anstieg des ostdeutschen Bruttoinlandsprodukts mit Berlin um 1,9% (Gemeinschaftsdiagnose für Deutschland insgesamt ebenfalls 1,9%). Der gegenüber dem Jahr 2016 (2,1%) etwas schwächere Zuwachs der Produktion resultiert lediglich aus der geringeren Anzahl von Arbeitstagen. Auch im Jahr 2018 dürfte die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft mit 2,0% so kräftig wie in Deutschland insgesamt zulegen.
Oliver Holtemöller
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National Politics and Bank Default Risk in the Eurozone
Stefan Eichler, Karol Sobanski
Journal of Financial Stability,
October
2016
Abstract
We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.
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Size of Training Firms and Cumulated Long-run Unemployment Exposure – The Role of Firms, Luck, and Ability in Young Workers’ Careers
Steffen Müller, Renate Neubäumer
Abstract
This paper analyzes how life-cycle unemployment of former apprentices depends on the size of the training firm. We start from the hypotheses that the size of training firms reduces long-run cumulated unemployment exposure, e.g. via differences in training quality and in the availability of internal labor markets, and that the access to large training firms depends positively on young workers’ ability and their luck to live in a region with many large and medium-sized training firms. We test these hypotheses empirically by using a large administrative data set for Germany and find corroborative evidence.
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Censored Fractional Response Model: Estimating Heterogeneous Relative Risk Aversion of European Households
Qizhou Xiong
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2015
Abstract
This paper estimates relative risk aversion using the observed shares of risky assets and characteristics of households from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank. Given that the risky share is a fractional response variable belonging to [0, 1], this paper proposes a censored fractional response estimation method using extremal quantiles to approximate the censoring thresholds. Considering that participation in risky asset markets is costly, I estimate both the heterogeneous relative risk aversion and participation cost using a working sample that includes both risky asset holders and non-risky asset holders by treating the zero risky share as the result of heterogeneous self-censoring. Estimation results show lower participation costs and higher relative risk aversion than what was previously estimated. The estimated median relative risk aversions of eight European countries range from 4.6 to 13.6. However, the results are sensitive to households’ perception of the risky asset market return and volatility.
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Macroeconomic Factors and Micro-Level Bank Risk
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 20/2010,
2010
Abstract
The interplay between banks and the macroeconomy is of key importance for financial and economic stability. We analyze this link using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) which extends a standard VAR for the U.S. macroeconomy. The model includes GDP growth, inflation, the Federal Funds rate, house price inflation, and a set of factors summarizing conditions in the banking sector. We use data of more than 1,500 commercial banks from the U.S. call reports to address the following questions. How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to bank risk and other banking variables? What are the sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences in individual banks’ responses to macroeconomic shocks? Our paper has two main findings: (i) Average bank risk declines, and average bank lending increases following expansionary shocks. (ii) The heterogeneity of banks is characterized by idiosyncratic shocks and the asymmetric transmission of common shocks. Risk of about 1/3 of all banks rises in response to a monetary loosening. The lending response of small, illiquid, and domestic banks is relatively large, and risk of banks with a low degree of capitalization and a high exposure to real estate loans decreases relatively strongly after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Also, lending of larger banks increases less while risk of riskier and domestic banks reacts more in response to house price shocks.
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An Options-based Approach to Forecast Competing Bids: Evidence for Canadian Takeover Battles
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Applied Economics,
No. 34,
2013
Abstract
During takeover battles, a tender offer provides a call option right to the target’s shareholders: it guarantees the offered price but maintains the chance of a higher offer. We present an options-based approach to estimate the probability and expected value of higher competing takeover bids using target stock price data. Analysing Canadian takeover battles in the period 1997 to 2007 we find that during the 5 trading days prior to the occurrence of an increased takeover bid, the estimated probability of a higher bid exceeds 80% on average and the expected value of a potential competing bid almost matches the realized value.
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IWH-Indikatoren zur Kapitalmarktregulierung: Hinweise auf eine Renaissance der Kapitalverkehrskontrollen
Makram El-Shagi
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2011
Abstract
Mittels der hier erstmals vorgestellten IWH-Indikatoren zur Beschreibung der Regulierungsintensität internationaler Kapitalmärkte ist es möglich, Kapitalverkehrskontrollen künftig mit ökonometrischen Verfahren zu evaluieren. Der Datensatz deckt über 150 Länder und einen Zeitraum von bisher 13 Jahren (1997 bis 2009) ab. Er unterscheidet Kapitalverkehrskontrollen nicht nur nach ihrer Intensität, sondern auch nach der Richtung (Zufluss oder Abfluss) der regulierten Kapitalströme. So kann den unterschiedlichen Folgen von Kapitalmarktpolitik Rechnung getragen werden, je nachdem, ob sie durch Zuflusskontrollen dem Aufbau riskanter Außenpositionen entgegenwirken möchte, oder ob sie – wesentlich weiter verbreitet – auf eine Erhöhung des heimischen
Kapitalangebots abzielt. Die explizite Berücksichtigung von diskretionären Entscheidungsspielräumen gestattet es darüber hinaus, auch die institutionelle Ausgestaltung von Kapitalverkehrskontrollen in die empirische Analyse
einzubeziehen. Erste Auswertungen der Indikatoren zeigen in der Folge der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise eine weltweite Renaissance der Regulierung grenzüberschreitender Kapitalströme. Der Anteil regulierter Teilmärkte ist von 2007 bis 2009 global um ca. zehn Prozentpunkte angestiegen. Kapitalimporte und -exporte sind dabei in ähnlicher Form betroffen. Der Anstieg der Kontrollintensität geht nicht auf massive Eingriffe einzelner Staaten zurück, sondern ist
über alle betrachteten Ländergruppen hinweg zu beobachten. Teilweise, wie z. B. in den Transformationsökonomien des früheren Warschauer Paktes, wurden viele Jahre der Liberalisierungsanstrengungen in kurzer Zeit kompensiert. Diese Entwicklung ist insofern bedenklich, als dass sich theoretische Überlegungen bezüglich Kapitalverkehrskontrollen stark widersprechen und auch keine empirische Evidenz vorliegt, die eine solche Politik rechtfertigt.
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