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The Drivers of Revenue Productivity: a New Decomposition Analysis with Firm-level Data

Filippo di Mauro, Giordano Mion, Daniel Stöhlker
ECB Working Paper, No. 2014, 2017
Abstract
This paper aims to derive a methodology to decompose aggregate revenue TFP changes over time into four different components – namely physical TFP, mark-ups, quality and production scale. The new methodology is applied to a panel of EU countries and manufacturing industries over the period 2006-2012. In summary, patterns of measured revenue productivity have been broadly similar across EU countries, most notably when we group them into stressed (Italy, Spain and Slovenia) and non-stressed countries (Belgium, Finland, France and Germany). In particular, measured revenue productivity drops for both groups by about 6 percent during the recent crisis. More specifically, for both stressed and non-stressed countries the drop in revenue productivity was accompanied by a substantial dip in the proxy we use for TFP in quantity terms, as well as by a strong reduction in mark-ups.
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Banks Credit and Productivity Growth

Fadi Hassan, Filippo di Mauro, Gianmarco Ottaviano
ECB Working Paper, No. 2008, 2017
Abstract
Financial institutions are key to allocate capital to its most productive uses. In order to examine the relationship between productivity and bank credit in the context of different financial market set-ups, we introduce a model of overlapping generations of entrepreneurs under complete and incomplete credit markets. Then, we exploit firm-level data for France, Germany and Italy to explore the relation between bank credit and productivity following the main derivations of the model. We estimate an extended set of elasticities of bank credit with respect to a series of productivity measures of firms. We focus not only on the elasticity between bank credit and productivity during the same year, but also on the elasticity between credit and future realised productivity. Our estimates show a clear Eurozone core-periphery divide, the elasticities between credit and productivity estimated in France and Germany are consistent with complete markets, whereas in Italy they are consistent with incomplete markets. The implication is that in Italy firms turn to be constrained in their long-term investments and bank credit is allocated less efficiently than in France and Germany. Hence capital misallocation by banks can be a key driver of the long-standing slow productivity growth that characterises Italy and other periphery countries. 
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EFN Report Autumn 2016: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2017 and 2017

EFN Reports, No. 4, 2016
Abstract
During the first half of 2016, investment activity of private firms was weak in most advanced economies and labour producitivity was even decreasing, as was world trade in goods. Consumption of private households, however, kept the world economy afloat. Within this global context, the modest recovery of the euro area economy continues, with important tailwinds from labour markets. Employment ist expanding everywhre, even in those countries, such as France and Italy, where unemployment rates have still not come down significantly. Since monetary and fisical policies will not become more expansive in 2017, the stimulus from cheap oil is fading, and exports to the UK will be dragged down by the fallout of the Brexit votem there is reason to expect the euro area recovery to lose some momentum. GDP will, according to our forecast, increase by 1,6% in this year and by 1,5% in 2017, about as much as potential output in the euro area. Our inflation forecast for 2016 is 0,2%. For 2017, we expect inflation to increase up to 1,2%, as during next year the favourable effects of decreasing energy prices will fade off.
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Monetary-fiscal Policy Interaction and Fiscal Inflation: A Tale of Three Countries

Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Samad Sarferaz
European Economic Review, 2016
Abstract
We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.
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Monetary-fiscal Policy Interaction and Fiscal Inflation: A Tale of Three Countries

Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Samad Sarferaz
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 17, 2015
published in: European Economic Review
Abstract
We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary-fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S. and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of high fiscal budget deficits and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary-fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.
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EFN Report Spring 2015: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 2, 2015
Abstract
Recent movements on world markets for commodities, currencies and capital stimulate the world economy, but they entail also considerable risks: income losses of energy exporting countries might trigger financial crises with worldwide repercussions; crises might also emerge from financial distress of emerging market debtors with liabilities denominated in US dollars. Extremely low interest rates might not only trigger stock and bond price booms, but also more volatility if investors become fearful of financial bubbles. Quite a few conditions are highly beneficial for a recovery of the euro area economy: governments and large corporations benefit from ultra-low bond yields, banks’ composite costs of debt financing have been converging during the past two years to very low levels, and borrowing costs for non-financial corporations have come down markedly. Prices for stocks, bonds and (on average) houses have gone up. Real disposable incomes of private households have risen due to oil prices. The real effective exchange rate is about 10% lower in March 2015 than it was a year ago, strengthening the price competitiveness of firms in the euro area. According to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.6% in 2015 and by 2.1% in 2016. Structural impediments, however, still limit the ability of the euro area economy to grow strongly: firms and, in particular, private households are only slowly reducing their heavy debt burdens, and confidence will not fully come back in France and Italy, as long as reform processes are inconclusive in both countries and as long as unemployment is not coming down markedly. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.1%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.3%, still clearly below the 2% ECB’s target. This calls for continued monetary expansion, though its effects could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus, in particular in those countries where the implementation of structural reforms brings long term gains but short term losses.
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Euro Area External Imbalances and the Burden of Adjustment

Filippo di Mauro, Francesco Pappadà
Journal of International Money and Finance, November 2014
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explore the consequences of the correction of Euro area trade imbalances on real exchange rates. This analysis requires one additional dimension with respect to the standard Global Imbalances framework à la Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), since the adjustment takes place within and outside the Euro area. Both types of adjustments are analyzed in a three-country general equilibrium model with a tradable and a non-tradable sectors, and heterogeneous firms built upon Pappadà (2011). ECB (CompNet) data are used to measure the differences in firm size and productivity dispersion across Euro area countries. With respect to the surplus country (Germany), countries running a trade deficit (Spain, Italy) are characterised by a productivity distribution with a lower mean and a less fat right tail. This increases the relative price movement associated with the external adjustment because of the limited role played by the extensive margin. We show that the real exchange rate movements are underestimated when the cross-country differences in terms of productivity distributions are neglected.
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EFN Report Summer 2014: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2014 and 2015

, 2014
Abstract
World growth disappointed at the beginning of the year, when in the US extremely cold weather caused production to contract, the recovery in the euro area stumbled and the slowdown of the Chinese economy continued. At present, however, confidence indicators and order books point to a moderate pickup of growth in most regions. Prices on markets for energy, real and financial assets have reacted little to recent bad news about rising geopolitical risks in the Middle East and Eastern Europe up to now. A sudden increase of risk aversion or a change of believes among investors could trigger a swift deterioration of financial conditions for the world economy. In the euro area, strong stimuli from abroad are not to be expected and private households continue to keep their real spending about constant. Investment has been expanding since summer 2013, but at a very moderate rate. In this context, our forecast for GDP growth is 1.1% in 2014 and 1.6% in 2015. For 2014 and 2015, we do not see any significant reduction of the unemployment rate, because employment dynamics will stay weak due to subdued growth and the still rising participation rate in the euro area. Our inflation forecast for 2014 is 0.6%. In 2015 inflation will also remain subdued, at about 1.0%. In this context of very low price dynamics, monetary policy keeps the recovery alive: official interest rates around zero and the search for yields on financial markets have depressed yields for government bonds; the fall in financing costs allows euro area governments to conduct fiscal policies that are much less restrictive than in the years before, with tax cuts in Italy, France, and Spain starting this year. Nonfinancial firms benefit from a shrinking burden of interest payments, and the availability of bank loans for small and medium enterprises has improved since 2012 in most countries.
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EFN Report Spring 2012: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2012 and 2013

, 2012
Abstract
In the first months of 2012 there were some mild signs of improvement in the world economy, to a large degree due to political measures taken in the euro area at the end of 2011. In particular, the ECB secured financing of banks by offering liquidity for as longs as three years and by easing standards for collateral. However, the southern countries of the euro area will stay in recession for most of the year 2012: planned fiscal consolidation in Spain and Italy has a magnitude of about 3% relative to GDP, in Portugal and Greece the restriction is even larger. The structural reforms need time to take beneficial effects, and the real sector is largely out of reach of the expansive monetary policy.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models

Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance, No. 3, 2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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