Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
Michael Koetter, Natalia Podlich, Michael Wedow
ECB Working Paper Series,
No. 2017,
2017
Abstract
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
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18.10.2016 • 46/2016
No Sign of Price Distortions – Lack of Evidence for Effects of US Bank Bailouts
There has been much political and public controversy surrounding the very large rescue packages offered to the banking sector in the course of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The aim of the packages was to stabilise the financial sector and, therefore, the development of the real economy. The downsides of these bailouts were the enormous financial cost to the taxpayer, increased assumption of risk by the government and possible distortive effects on competition in the banking market – since not all banks were given financial support. Researchers at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association led by Professor Felix Noth have now studied the long-term, indirect and possible market-distorting effects of the US rescue packages.
Felix Noth
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Preisverzerrungen Fehlanzeige – Keine Hinweise für Effekte der Bankenrettung in den USA
Felix Noth, Karolin Vogt
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
Im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 rückte die Kontroverse um staatliche Notrettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor verstärkt ins Blickfeld. Diese Programme haben das Ziel, den Finanzsektor und somit auch realwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu stabilisieren. Dem stehen die finanziellen Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat sowie mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur gegenüber. Dieser Artikel diskutiert mögliche Preisverzerrungen durch das Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in den USA aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags, der die langfristigen indirekten Effekte des Programms innerhalb der Gruppe der nicht unterstützten Banken untersucht. Hierbei zeigen sich keine Hinweise dafür, dass das Programm zur Bankenrettung zu nachhaltigen Unterschieden im Bankenwettbewerb nach 2010 geführt hat. Die Zinsmargen von Banken mit einer höheren Rettungswahrscheinlichkeit stiegen nur in der direkten Folgezeit von TARP, d. h. im Jahr 2010 an. Ein signifikanter Anstieg des Kredit- und Depotwachstum der Banken für den Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2013 kann nicht verzeichnet werden.
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09.09.2016 • 37/2016
Comment: IWH President Reint E. Gropp: ECB resists its critics and maintains its asset purchase programme. Leaving the option for a further extension is completely reasonable.
Some observers, including recently a number of major banks, are criticising the European Central Bank (ECB) for maintaining its asset purchase program, currently scheduled to run until March of 2017 and leaving the option open to extend it further.
Reint E. Gropp
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Unsupported Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Monetary Policy under the Microscope: Intra-bank Transmission of Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB
L. Cycon, Michael Koetter
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 9,
2015
Abstract
With a unique loan portfolio maintained by a top-20 universal bank in Germany, this study tests whether unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced corporate borrowing costs. We decompose corporate lending rates into refinancing costs, as determined by money markets, and markups that the bank is able to charge its customers in regional markets. This decomposition reveals how banks transmit monetary policy within their organizations. To identify policy effects on loan rate components, we exploit the co-existence of eurozone-wide security purchase programs and regional fiscal policies at the district level. ECB purchase programs reduced refinancing costs significantly, even in an economy not specifically targeted for sovereign debt stress relief, but not loan rates themselves. However, asset purchases mitigated those loan price hikes due to additional credit demand stimulated by regional tax policy and enabled the bank to realize larger economic margins.
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Competitive Distortions of Bank Bailouts
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Crises, rescues, and policy transmission through international banks
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 15/2011,
2011
Abstract
The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking
and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of
markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into
foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks
have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures
has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the
German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy
interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.
Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded
relative to affiliates of other German banks.
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Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations
Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Finance,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
Low‐cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.
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