Do Women Benefit from Competitive Markets? Product Market Competition and the Gender Pay Gap in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Michael Oberfichtner, Claus Schnabel
Economics Bulletin,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
Using a large linked employer–employee dataset for Germany with a direct plant-level measure of product market competition and controlling for job-cell fixed effects, we investigate whether relative wages of women benefit from strong competition. We find that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 2.4 log points lower in West German plants that face strong product market competition than in those experiencing weak competition, whereas no such link shows up for East Germany.
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Differences in Labor Supply to Monopsonistic Firms and the Gender Pay Gap: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked Employer‐Employee Data from Germany
Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel
Journal of Labor Economics,
No. 2,
2010
Abstract
This article investigates women’s and men’s labor supply to the firm within a semistructural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a large linked employer‐employee data set for Germany, we find that labor supply elasticities are small (1.9–3.7) and that women’s labor supply to the firm is less elastic than men’s (which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market). Our results imply that at least one‐third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by profit‐maximizing monopsonistic employers.
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Monopsonistic Labour Markets and the Gender Pay Gap: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Boris Hirsch
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
No. 639,
2010
Abstract
This book investigates models of spatial and dynamic monopsony and their application to the persistent empirical regularity of the gender pay gap. Theoretically, the main conclusion is that employers possess more monopsony power over their female employees if women are less driven by pecuniary considerations in their choice of employers than men. Employers may exploit this to increase their profits at the detriment of women’s wages. Empirically, it is indeed found that women’s labour supply to the firm is less wage-elastic than men’s and that at least a third of the gender pay gap in the data investigated may result from employers engaging in monopsonistic discrimination. Therefore, a monopsonistic approach to gender discrimination in the labour market clearly contributes to the economic understanding of the gender pay gap. It not only provides an intuitively appealing explanation of the gap from standard economic reasoning, but it is also corroborated by empirical observation.
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Market Concentration and Innovation in Transnational Corporations: Evidence from Foreign Affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe
Liviu Voinea, Johannes Stephan
Research on Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalization (Progress in International Business Research, Volume 4),
2009
Abstract
Purpose – The main research question of this contribution is whether local market concentration influences R&D and innovation activities of foreign affiliates of transnational companies.
Methodology/approach – We focus on transition economies and use discriminant function analysis to investigate differences in the innovation activity of foreign affiliates operating in concentrated markets, compared to firms operating in nonconcentrated markets. The database consists of the results of a questionnaire administered to a representative sample of foreign affiliates in a selection of five transition economies.
Findings – We find that foreign affiliates in more concentrated markets, when compared to foreign affiliates in less concentrated markets, export more to their own foreign investor's network, do more basic and applied research, use more of the existing technology already incorporated in the products of their own foreign investor's network, do less process innovation, and acquire less knowledge from abroad.
Research limitations/implications – The results may be specific to transition economies only.
Practical implications – The main implications of these results are that host country market concentration stimulates intranetwork knowledge diffusion (with a risk of transfer pricing), while more intense competition stimulates knowledge creation (at least as far as process innovation is concerned) and knowledge absorption from outside the affiliates' own network. Policy makers should focus their support policies on companies in more competitive sectors, as they are more likely to transfer new technologies.
Originality/value – It contributes to the literature on the relationship between market concentration and innovation, based on a unique survey database of foreign affiliates of transnational corporations operating in Eastern Europe.
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The Gender Pay Gap under Duopsony: Joan Robinson meets Harold Hotelling
Boris Hirsch
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style duopsony model of the labour market. Since there are only two employers, equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that some women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women on average are less inclined to commute and offer lower wages to all women. Since women's firm-level labour supply is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model is in line with Robinson's explanation of wage discrimination.
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Discrimination of combination wage recipients by municipal labor market policy
Cornelia Lang, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Hilmar Schneider
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 13,
2001
Abstract
Die Funktion der sozialen Grundsicherung wird in Deutschland durch die Sozialhilfe und die Arbeitslosenhilfe abgedeckt. Während jedoch die Finanzierung der Arbeitslosenhilfe durch den Bund erfolgt, obliegt die Finanzierung der Sozialhilfe den Kommunen. Dieser Dualismus führt mutmaßlich zur Benachteiligung sogenannter Kombihilfeempfänger im Hinblick auf deren Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt durch Maßnahmen der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Kombihilfeempfänger sind Personen, deren staatlich garantiertes Mindesteinkommen sowohl aus Sozialhilfe als auch aus Arbeitslosenunterstützung besteht. Ihr Einkommensanspruch ist zwar nicht höher als der von reinen Sozialhilfeempfängern, doch die zwischen Bund und Kommunen geteilte Zuständigkeit für dessen Finanzierung erzeugt Anreize zur gegenseitigen Lastenverschiebung....
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