Internal Migration in East Germany After Reunification: Demographic and Economic Effects
Matthias Wieschemeyer
H.-G. Jeong and G. Heimpold (eds.): Economic Transition in Unified Germany and Implications for Korea. Policy References 17-13. Sejong: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy,
2017
Abstract
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Key Economic Decisions in the Course of German Unification
Gerhard Heimpold, Maike Irrek
H.-G. Jeong and G. Heimpold (eds.): Economic Transition in Unified Germany and Implications for Korea. Policy References 17-13. Sejong: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy,
2017
Abstract
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Restructuring of Industrial Enterprises in the Course of Privatization in East Germany
Gerhard Heimpold
H.-G. Jeong and G. Heimpold (eds.): Economic Transition in Unified Germany and Implications for Korea. Policy References 17-13. Sejong: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy,
2017
Abstract
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Social Distress and Economic Integration
Walter Hyll, Lutz Schneider
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2016
Abstract
We analyze whether social distress from income comparisons affects attitudes towards the integration of economies. Using Germany’s division as natural experiment, we find that East Germans’ feelings of relative deprivation with respect to better-off West Germans led to significantly more support for the upcoming German re-unification.
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Social Comparisons and Attitudes towards Foreigners. Evidence from the ‘Fall of the Iron Curtain’
Walter Hyll, Lutz Schneider
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2016
Abstract
We exploit the natural experiment of German re-unification to address the question whether distress from social (income) comparisons results in negative attitudes towards foreigners. Our empirical approach rests upon East German individuals who have West German peers. We use the exogenous variation of wealth of West German peers shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall as an instrument to identify the effect of distress from social comparisons on East Germans’ attitudes. We find robust evidence that East Germans expose strong negative attitudes towards foreigners, particularly from low-wage countries, if they worry about their economic status compared to better-off peers.
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Transfer Payments without Growth: Evidence for German Regions, 1992–2005
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
After German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 4% of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states (i.e. those which were formerly part of the German Democratic Republic). We show that, between 1992 and 2005, infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies had a negative net impact on regional economic growth and convergence. This result is robust to both the specification of spatially weighted control variables and the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for the endogeneity of subsidies. Our results suggest that regional redistribution was ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles.
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Can Korea Learn from German Unification?
Ulrich Blum
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2011
Abstract
We first analyze pre-unification similarities and differences between the two Germanys and the two Koreas in terms of demographic, social, political and economic status. An important issue is the degree of international openness. “Stone-age” type communism of North Korea and the seclusion of the population prevented inner-Korean contacts and contacts with rest of the world. This may create enormous adjustment costs if institutions, especially informal institutions, change. We go on by showing how transition and integration interact in a potential unification process based on the World Bank Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) and on the Salter-Swan-Meade model. In doing so, we relate the macro and external impacts on an open economy to its macro-sectoral structural dynamics. The findings suggest that it is of utmost importance to relate microeconomic policies to the macroeconomic ties and side conditions for both parts of the country. Evidence from Germany suggests that the biggest general error in unification was neglecting these limits, especially limitations to policy instruments. Econometric analysis supports these findings. In the empirical part, we consider unification as an “investment” and track down the (by-and-large immediate to medium-term) costs and the (by-and-large long-term) benefits of retooling a retarded communist economy. We conclude that, from a South-Korean
perspective, the Korean unification will become relatively much more expensive than the German unification and, thus, not only economic, but to a much larger degree political considerations must include the tying of neighboring countries into the convergence process. We finally provide, 62 years after Germany’s division and 20 years after unification, an outlook on the strength of economic inertia in order to show that it may take much more than a generation to compensate the damage inflicted by the communist system.
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Investor Rationality and House Price Bubbles: The Case of Berlin and the German Reunification
Oliver Holtemöller, R. Schulz
German Economic Review,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the behavior of investors in the Berlin rental apartment house market over the years 1980–2004. Using constant-quality multipliers (price–rent ratios), we reject the hypothesis that multipliers in the market were set in a rational manner. Supported by narrative evidence, we conjecture that investors misjudged the economic effects of the German reunification. To examine this, we employ a stylized structural economic model and analyze the effects of shocks on rational multipliers. It seems that investors confused the reunification with a permanent supply side shock to the economy. By basing their investment decisions on this misjudgement, investors behaved irrationally, but in a very uncertain and unprecedented environment.
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Interactive Dynamic Capabilities and Regenerating the East German Innovation System
N. von Tunzelmann, Jutta Günther, Katja Wilde, Björn Jindra
Contributions to Political Economy,
2010
Abstract
The paper sets out a specification of capabilities and competencies derived from Sen’s work on consumer capabilities and welfare economics. This approach is one that proves remarkably easy to generalise, first to producer and supplier capabilities, and thence to interactive and dynamic capabilities. The approach is then applied via the consequential perspectives of regional systems of innovation and network alignment to the case of the efforts to regenerate the innovation system in East Germany since reunification. It is seen that this process can be divided into three periods, of which the most recent appears to meet some of the theoretical requirements for effective interactive capabilities. It is less clear that the criteria for dynamic capabilities—which involve considerations of speed-up and flexibility, to meet the market requirements in real time—have yet been taken sufficiently seriously.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
Post-Communist Economies,
2010
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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