Die Identifikation des „Wirtschaftlichen Vorteils“ in Kartellverfahren
Ulrich Blum, Michael A. Veltins
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
Mittels der Abschöpfung eines „Wirtschaftlichen Vorteils“ im Rahmen von Kartellstrafen sollen gleichermaßen im Sinne einer Bebußung negative Anreize für wettbewerbswidriges Handeln gesetzt und hierdurch aufgetretene Wettbewerbsvorteile ausgeglichen werden. Dabei ist die ökonomische Feststellung eines Kartells wissenschaftlich äußerst schwierig und die Möglichkeiten einer genauen Bestimmung hieraus entstandener eventueller Vorteile sind problematisch. Der Beitrag führt in die theoretischen Grundlagen der Identifikation eines wirtschaftlichen Vorteils ein, zeigt mögliche Modellformulierungen auf und wertet diese am Beispiel des aktuellen Zementverfahrens aus, um die erheblichen Probleme einer Wettbewerbsbehörde zu verdeutlichen, eine ökonomisch klare Beweisführung bereitzustellen.
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ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies: Evidence for Chilean Retailers
Gaaitzen J. de Vries, Michael Koetter
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
The adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) can have far-reaching effects on the nature of production technologies. Because ICT adoption is incomplete, especially in developing countries, different groups of firms will have different production technologies. We estimate a latent class stochastic frontier model, which allows us to test for the existence of multiple production technologies across firms and consider the associated implications for efficiency measures. We use a unique data set of Chilean retailers, which includes detailed information on ICT adoption. We find three distinct production technologies. The probability of membership in a more productive group is positively related to ICT use.
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Enjoying the Quiet Life Under Deregulation? Evidence from Adjusted Lerner Indices for U.S. Banks
Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Laura Spierdijk
Review of Economics and Statistics,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
The quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents. We propose a simple adjustment to Lerner indices to account for the possibility of foregone rents to test this hypothesis. For a large sample of U.S. commercial banks, we find that adjusted Lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional Lerner indices and trending upward over time. Instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies. However, Lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among U.S. banks.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Transfer Payments without Growth: Evidence for German Regions, 1992–2005
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
After German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 4% of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states (i.e. those which were formerly part of the German Democratic Republic). We show that, between 1992 and 2005, infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies had a negative net impact on regional economic growth and convergence. This result is robust to both the specification of spatially weighted control variables and the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for the endogeneity of subsidies. Our results suggest that regional redistribution was ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles.
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Der Konflikt zwischen tariflichen oder staatlichen Mindestlöhnen und dem Sozialhilfeniveau
Rüdiger Pohl
Externe Publikationen,
2000
Abstract
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Mittel- und Osteuropa in der Weltfinanzkrise: Simultanes Auftreten von Banken- und Währungskrisen?
Diemo Dietrich, Axel Lindner, Tobias Knedlik
A. F. Michler, H. D. Smeets (Hrsg.), Die aktuelle Finanzkrise: Bestandsaufnahme und Lehren für die Zukunft. Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Bd. 93,
2011
Abstract
Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich der Frage, ob in der Weltfinanzkrise die (Post-)transformationsländer Mittel- und Osteuropas durch Zwillingskrisen betroffen waren, ob also sowohl deren Währungen unter starken Abwertungsdruck gerieten als auch deren Bankensysteme nicht mehr in der Lage waren, ihre Intermediationsfunktionen wahrzunehmen. Hierbei wird den Besonderheiten dieser Länder insoweit Rechnung getragen, als dass die Struktur ihres Bankensektors und das Ausmaß ihrer internationalen Verschuldung berücksichtigt werden.
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The Impact of Preferences on Early Warning Systems - The Case of the European Commission's Scoreboard
Tobias Knedlik
European Journal of Political Economy,
2014
Abstract
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It allows the preferences of the politicians involved to be analysed with regard to the two potential errors of an early warning system – missing a crisis and issuing a false alarm. These preferences might differ with the institutional setting. Such an analysis is done for the first time in this article for early warning systems in general by using a standard signals approach, including a preference-based optimisation approach, to set thresholds. It is shown that, in general, the thresholds of the Commission’s Scoreboard are set low (resulting in more alarm signals), as compared to a neutral stand. Based on political economy considerations the result could have been expected.
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Still Overbanked and Unprofitable? Two Decades of German Banking
Michael Koetter, Thorsten Nestmann, Stéphanie Stolz, Michael Wedow
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
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