Progress reports from the project "Productivity Gap"
Johannes Stephan
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
The project assesses the roles played by determinants of productivity gaps between Accession Countries in Central East Europe and the more advanced countries in Western Europe. The focus is on the respective weights of determinants and their influence on the potentials for future productivity catch-up.
The convenient feature about assessing productivity levels is that they inform us about the narrowing or divergence of income gaps, provide an indication of international competitiveness, and the sustainability of growth paths (technological development).
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light of EU Accession
Jens Hölscher
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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Competition Policy in Central East Europe in light of EU Accession
Johannes Stephan
Journal of Common Market Studies,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Firm-Specific Determinants of Productivity Gaps between East and West German Industrial Branches
Johannes Stephan, Karin Szalai
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 183,
2003
Abstract
Industrial productivity levels of formerly socialist economies in Central East Europe (including East Germany) are considerably lower than in the more mature Western economies. This research aims at assessing the reasons for lower productivities at the firm level: what are the firm-specific determinants of productivity gaps. To assess this, we have conducted an extensive field study and focussed on a selection of two important manufacturing industries, namely machinery manufacturers and furniture manufacturers, and on the construction industry. Using the data generated in field work, we test a set of determinant-candidates which were derived from theory and prior research in that topic. Our analysis uses the simplest version of the matched-pair approach, in which first hypothesis about relevant productivity level-determinants are tested. In a second step, positively tested hypothesis are further assessed in terms of whether they also constitute firm-specific determinants of the apparent gaps between the firms in our Eastern and such in our Western panels. Our results suggest that the quality of human capital plays an important role in all three industrial branches assessed. Amongst manufacturing firms, networking activities and the use of modern technologies for communication are important reasons for the lower levels of labour productivity in the East. The intensity of long-term strategic planning on behalf of the management turned out to be relevant only for machinery manufacturers. Product and process innovations unexpectedly exhibit an ambiguous picture, as did the extent of specialisation on a small number of products in the firms’ portfolio and the intensity of competition.
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Unit labor costs and competitiveness - a micro econometric analysis for East Germany
Harald Lehmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 180,
2003
Abstract
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Ostdeutschland hängt neben der Gründung neuer Unternehmen und der Attraktion auswärtiger Investitionen vor allem davon ab, wie es den bestehenden Unternehmen gelingt, ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu steigern bzw. auf einem hohen Niveau zu halten. Wettbewerbsfähige Betriebe sind auch immer rentable Betriebe. Sie sind in der Lage Eigenkapital aufzubauen, was eine wichtige Voraussetzung fur die Finanzierung von Innovationen und Investitionen, aber auch für eine gewisse Krisenfestigkeit ist. Damit tragen sie erheblich zum gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wachstum und zu höherer Beschäftigung bei.
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A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 275,
2002
Abstract
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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