Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
Read article
03.05.2016 • 20/2016
Are Lacking Structural Reforms in the Financial Sector the Underlying Reason for the German Criticism of the ECB?
The major reason for the intense criticism of the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) low-interest-rate policy may be the lack of structural reforms in the German banking system. The resulting persistent fragmentation increases the banking sector’s vulnerability to the low-interest-rate environment. Hence, parts of the banking sector, due to their strong ties to politicians, appear to have successfully influenced public opinion against the ECB.
Reint E. Gropp
Read
Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece
Nikolaos Artavanis, Adair Morse, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
We document that in semiformal economies, banks lend to tax-evading individuals based on the bank’s assessment of the individual’s true income. This observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion. We use microdata on household credit from a Greek bank and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals’ true income. We estimate that 43–45% of self-employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed. For 2009, this implies €28.2 billion of unreported income, implying forgone tax revenues of over €11 billion or 30% of the deficit. Our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods. Primary tax-evading industries are professional services—medicine, law, engineering, education, and media. We conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions, paper trail, and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion.
Read article
Hold-up and the Use of Performance-sensitive Debt
Tim R. Adam, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
April
2016
Abstract
We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated deals, however, the presence of a relationship lead arranger reduces the use of PSD because a lead arranger has little incentive to hold-up a client. Further supporting the hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants.
Read article
Mere Criticism of the ECB is no Solution
M. Fratzscher, Reint E. Gropp, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Hans-Helmut Kotz, Christian Odendahl, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Guntram Wolff
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
2016
Abstract
Die Kritik an der EZB in Deutschland ist kontraproduktiv. Die Geldpolitik muss expansiv bleiben, damit die EZB ihrem Mandat zumindest ansatzweise gerecht wird. Das gebietet auch der Erhalt ihrer Glaubwürdigkeit. Die EZB muss nicht weniger, sondern Europas Politik muss mehr tun. Sie muss entschiedener handeln, um Europa wieder auf einen Wachstumspfad zu bringen.
[Eine kürzere Version des Beitrags ist unter dem Titel “Kritik an Draghi ist noch keine Lösung“ erschienen in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung vom 10 April 2016].
Die Politik, auch die deutsche, darf sich nicht länger ihrer Mitverantwortung für die gegenwärtige wirtschaftliche Lage in weiten Teilen Europas entziehen. Benötigt werden eine wachstumsfreundliche Fiskalpolitik, Strukturreformen zur Öffnung neuer Märkte und eine Konsolidierung und Restrukturierung des Finanzsektors. Dabei müssen vor allem wir in Deutschland uns den Spiegel vorhalten – denn die meisten dieser Reformen benötigen wir genauso dringend wie unsere europäischen Nachbarn.
Read article
Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Unsupported Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
Read article
Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from trading in bank business models. Prominent reform proposals are the Volcker Rule in the U.S., the Vickers Report in the UK, and, based on the Liikanen proposal, the Barnier proposal in the EU. A major element of these reforms is to separate “classical” commercial banking activities from securities trading activities, notably from proprietary trading. While the reforms are at different stages of implementation, there is a strong ongoing discussion on what possible economic consequences are to be expected. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative approaches of these reform proposals and to assess their likely consequences for bank business models, risk-taking and financial stability. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of only proprietary trading, as envisaged in the current EU proposal, is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it likely crowds out desired trading activities, thereby negatively affecting financial stability. Second, there is potentially a better solution to limit excessive trading risk at banks in terms of potential welfare consequences: Trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations. This kind of separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
Read article
The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication
Daniel Streitz
Review of Finance,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.
Read article
To Separate or not to Separate Investment from Commercial Banking? An Empirical Analysis of Attention Distortion under Multiple Tasks
Reint E. Gropp, K. Park
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
In the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, a number of policy reports (Vickers, Liikanen, Volcker) proposed to separate investment banking from commercial banking to increase financial stability. This paper empirically examines one theoretical justification for these proposals, namely attention distortion under multiple tasks as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Universal banks can be viewed as combining two different tasks (investment banking and commercial banking) in the same organization. We estimate pay-performance sensitivities for different segments within universal banks and for pure investment and commercial banks. We show that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in investment banking than in commercial banking, no matter whether it is organized as part of a universal bank or in a separate institution. Next, the paper shows that relative pay-performance sensitivities of investment and commercial banking are negatively related to the quality of the loan portfolio in universal banks. Depending on the specification, we obtain a reduction in problem loans when investment banking is removed from commercial banks of up to 12 percent. We interpret the evidence to imply that the higher pay-performance sensitivity in investment banking directs the attention of managers away from commercial banking within universal banks, consistent with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Separation of investment banking and commercial banking may indeed be associated with a reduction in risk in commercial banking.
Read article
Networks and the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Exploration
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, William R. Kerr
NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
2015
Abstract
How small shocks are amplified and propagated through the economy to cause sizable fluctuations is at the heart of much macroeconomic research. Potential mechanisms that have been proposed range from investment and capital accumulation responses in real business-cycle models (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1982) to Keynesian multipliers (e.g., Diamond 1982; Kiyotaki 1988; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987; Hall 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011); to credit market frictions facing firms, households, or banks (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2012; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013); to the role of real and nominal rigidities and their interplay (Ball and Romer 1990); and to the consequences of (potentially inappropriate or constrained) monetary policy (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1971; Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; Farhi and Werning 2013).
Read article