The Role of Rating Agencies in Financial Crises: Event Studies from the Asian Flu
Makram El-Shagi
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
2010
Abstract
Based on case studies from countries that have been hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the present paper shows that the accusation that sovereign ratings led to a severe acceleration of the crisis is unconvincing and that the empirical method often used to support accusations against rating agencies is inappropriate for the problem under analysis. Rather, it must be emphasised that ratings were downgraded in most countries very shortly before the end of the crisis. In some countries, the ratings were even further downgraded after the end of the crisis as countries started to recover. This is not in line with the thesis that the crisis was accelerated by rating agencies.
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Russia: Overcoming the Effects of Economic Crisis Takes Time
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt schrumpfte in Russland 2009 um nahezu 8% und damit stärker als in anderen großen Volkswirtschaften der Welt. Die spezifischen Bedingungen für das Wachstum in Russland haben sich im Zuge der Finanzkrise offenbart: Die Entwicklung des Ölpreises ist noch immer von großer Bedeutung, doch wurde die Wirtschaft breiter getroffen. Als besonderes Hemmnis hat sich unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen die mangelnde Funktionsfähigkeit des einheimischen Finanz- und Bankensektors für die Kreditversorgung des privaten Unternehmenssektors erwiesen, wodurch die Abhängigkeit der Unternehmen vom ausländischen Kapitalmarkt noch verstärkt wurde. Die Folgen der weltweiten Finanzkrise wurden durch diese institutionellen Schwächen in Russland verschärft und erschweren nun deren schnelle Überwindung. Zwar haben sich in den letzten Monaten im Zuge anziehender Rohstoffpreise und steigender Nachfrage die außenwirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen für die russische Wirtschaft verbessert; die Binnenwirtschaft wird aber vorerst nur gering expandieren, da die Talfahrt der Investitionen aufgrund der schwachen Ertragslage der Unternehmen und noch unzureichender Finanzierungsbedingungen weiter anhält. Die Überwindung der strukturellen Missstände wird längere Zeit in Anspruch nehmen als die kurzfristige Abfederung der Krisenfolgen über Finanztransfers. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird vor diesem Hintergrund 2010 und 2011 mit Raten zwischen 3% und 4% deutlich geringer zunehmen als im Durchschnitt der letzten Jahre.
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The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Abstract
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset-Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Im Fokus: Polen in der globalen Finanz- und Konjunkturkrise – Realwirtschaft trotzt mit IWF-Unterstützung den Finanzmarktturbulenzen
Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
Auch Polen konnte sich den Auswirkungen der globalen Finanzkrise nicht entziehen. Im Vergleich mit anderen Ländern Mittelosteuropas stellt Polen jedoch einen Sonderfall dar: Die Risikoprämien für handelbare Kreditversicherungen für Staatsanleihen (so genannte Credit Default Swaps, CDS) sind zwischen Juni 2007 und März 2009 weniger stark, dafür aber plötzlicher angestiegen als in den anderen Ländern der Region. Die Währungskrise begann in Polen früher und hielt länger an. Die krisenhaften Entwicklungen an den Kapital- und Währungsmärkten und der Einbruch der Exportnachfrage führten in Polen im Gegensatz zu seinen mittelosteuropäischen Nachbarländern nicht zu einer Rezession.
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Should We Trust in Leading Indicators? Evidence from the Recent Recession
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
The paper analyzes leading indicators for GDP and industrial production in Germany. We focus on the performance of single and pooled leading indicators during the pre-crisis and crisis period using various weighting schemes. Pairwise and joint significant tests are used to evaluate single indicator as well as forecast combination methods. In addition, we use an end-of-sample instability test to investigate the stability of forecasting models during the recent financial crisis. We find in general that only a small number of single indicator models were performing well before the crisis. Pooling can substantially increase the reliability of leading indicator forecasts. During the crisis the relative performance of many leading indicator models increased. At short horizons, survey indicators perform best, while at longer horizons financial indicators, such as term spreads and risk spreads, improve relative to the benchmark.
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Money and Inflation: The Role of Persistent Velocity Movements
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Abstract
While the long run relation between money and inflation is well established, empirical evidence on the adjustment to the long run equilibrium is very heterogeneous. In the present paper we use a multivariate state space framework, that substantially expands the traditional vector error correction approach, to analyze the short run impact of money on prices. We contribute to the literature in three ways: First, we distinguish changes in velocity of money that are due to institutional developments and thus do not induce inflationary pressure, and changes that reflect transitory movements in money demand. This is achieved with a newly developed multivariate unobserved components decomposition. Second, we analyze whether the high volatility of the transmission from monetary pressure to inflation follows some structure, i.e., if the parameter regime can assumed to be constant. Finally, we use our model to illustrate the consequences of the monetary policy of the Fed that has been employed to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis, simulating different exit strategy scenarios.
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Potential Effects of Basel II on the Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises – The Case of South Korea
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Journal of Money,
No. 13,
2010
Abstract
In this paper we evaluate potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to banking crises by analyzing the South Korean crisis of 1997. We show that regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. Furthermore we investigate whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since the East Asian crisis. We find no evidence that rating agencies have started to take micro-mismatches into account. Thus, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II.
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