Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset-Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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International Bank Portfolios: Short- and Long-Run Responses to Macroeconomic Conditions
S. Blank, Claudia M. Buch
Review of International Economics,
No. 2,
2010
Abstract
International bank portfolios constitute a large component of international country portfolios. Yet, banks’ response to international macroeconomic conditions remains largely unexplored.We use a novel dataset on banks’ international portfolios to answer three questions. First, what are the long-run determinants of banks’ international portfolios? Second, how do banks’ international portfolios adjust to short-run macroeconomic developments? Third, does the speed of adjustment change with the degree of financial integration?We find that, in the long-run, market size has a positive impact on foreign assets and liabilities. An increase in the interest differential between the home and the foreign economy lowers foreign assets and increases foreign liabilities. Foreign trade has a positive impact on international bank portfolios, which is independent from the effect of other macroeconomic variables. Short-run dynamics show heterogeneity across countries, but these dynamics can partly be explained with gravity-type variables.
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A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, A. K. Kashyap
Europe and the Euro,
2010
Abstract
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking. Data on cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no evidence of integration in retail banking. This paper shows that the previous tests of bank integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration. The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks' profitability. The new test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. European listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level. There is weak evidence that competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show improved profitability. Unlisted European banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being integrated. In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits driven down quickly.
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The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure
Reint E. Gropp, Florian Heider
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
The paper shows that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were of second-order importance in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks during 1991 to 2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to banks, except for banks whose capital ratio is close to the regulatory minimum. Consistent with a reduced role of deposit insurance, we document a shift in banks’ liability structure away from deposits towards non-deposit liabilities. We find that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are ultimately the most important determinant of banks’ capital structures and that banks’ leverage converges to bank specific, time-invariant targets.
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Macroeconomic Shocks and Banks' Foreign Assets
Claudia M. Buch, K. Carstensen, A. Schertler
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
Recent developments in international financial markets have highlighted the role of banks in the transmission of shocks across borders. We employ dynamic panel methods for a sample of OECD countries to analyze whether banks' foreign assets react to macroeconomic shocks at home and abroad. We find that banks reduce their foreign assets in response to a relative increase in domestic interest rates, and they increase their foreign assets when the growth rate of world energy prices rises. The responses are characterized by a temporal overshooting and a dynamic adjustment process that extends over several quarters.
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Deriving the Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk with a Compound Option Approach: The Case of Kazakhstan
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Discussion paper, Series 2: Banking and financial studies, No. 01/2010,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term default risk to each maturity. Applying the Duan (1994) maximum likelihood approach, we find for Kazakhstan that the overall crisis probability was mainly driven by short-term risk, which increased from 25% in March 2007 to 80% in December 2008. Concurrently, the long-term default risk increased from 20% to only 25% during the same period.
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Badr-El-Din A. Ibrahim:"Poverty Alleviation via Islamic Banking Finance to Micro-Enterprises in Sudan: Some lessons for poor countries
Tobias Knedlik, K. (eds.) Wohlmuth
Sudan Economic Research Group Discussion Papers, No. 35,
2003
Abstract
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Smuggling Illegal versus Legal Goods across the U.S.-Mexico Border: A Structural Equations Model Approach
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Southern Economic Journal,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
We study the smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico border from 1975 to 2004. Using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model we test the microeconomic determinants of both smuggling types and reveal their trends. We find that illegal goods smuggling decreased from $116 billion in 1984 to $27 billion in 2004 as a result of improved labor market conditions in Mexico and intensified U.S. border enforcement. Smuggling legal goods is motivated by tax and tariff evasion. While export misinvoicing fluctuated at low levels, import misinvoicing switched from underinvoicing to overinvoicing after Mexico's accession to the GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) induced lower tariffs.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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