The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Sector
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
The debate about the development of German electricity prices after the liberalization of energy markets in 1998 raises the question of failures in market restructuring. However, a general statement would be misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development, analyzed for the exemplary case of household prices, shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Structural Change during Transition: Is Russia Becoming a Service Economy?
Albrecht Kauffmann
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Potsdam, Nr. 80,
No. 80,
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the structural change in Russia during the transition from the planned to a market economy. With regard to the famous three sector hypothesis, broad economic sectors were formed as required by this theory. The computation of their shares at GNP at market prices using Input-Output tables, and the adjustment of results from distortions, generated as side effects of tax avoidance practices, shows results that clearly reject claims that Russia would be on the road to a post-industrial service economy. Instead, at least until 2001, a tendency of “primarisation“ could be observed, that presents Russia closer to less-developed countries.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Aggressive Orders and the Resiliency of a Limit Order Market
Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong, Maarten Van Ravenswaaij, Gunther Wuyts
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
We analyze the resiliency of a pure limit order market by investigating the limit order book (bid and ask prices, spreads, depth and duration), order flow and transaction prices in a window of best limit updates and transactions around aggressive orders (orders that move prices). We find strong persistence in the submission of aggressive orders. Aggressive orders take place when spreads and depths are relatively low, and they induce bid and ask prices to be persistently different after the shock. Depth and spread remain also higher than just before the order, but do return to their initial level within 20 best limit updates after the shock. Relative to the sample average, depths stay around their mean before and after aggressive orders, whereas spreads return to their mean after about twenty best limit updates. The initial price impact of the aggressive order is partly reversed in the subsequent transactions. However, the aggressive order produces a long-term effect as prices show a tendency to return slowly to the price of the aggressive order.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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