Financial Openness and Business Cycle Volatility
Claudia M. Buch, Jörg Döpke, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
This paper discusses whether the integration of international financial markets affects business cycle volatility. In the framework of a new open economy macro-model, we show that the link between financial openness and business cycle volatility depends on the nature of the underlying shock. Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Our results also show that the link between business cycle volatility and financial openness has not been stable over time.
Read article
Stability and Growth Pact: No appropriate Strategy for Consolidation
Kristina vanDeuverden
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
In den vergangenen Jahren verschlechterte sich die Lage der öffentlichen Haushalte in den Ländern der Europäischen Union zunehmend. Vor allem in langfristiger Hinsicht erscheint dies bedenklich, denn mit Blick auf die demographische Entwicklung zeichnen sich wachsende Belastungen ab. Die Notwendigkeit zur Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Finanzen und zur Gestaltung einer nachhaltigen Finanzpolitik ist offensichtlich. Konsolidierung kann auf einer Abfolge diskretionärer politischer Entscheidungen fußen oder aber regelgebunden betrieben werden. Dabei spricht viel für die Überlegenheit einer Regelbindung. Auch in der EU hat man sich mit der Schaffung des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts für diesen Weg entschieden. Der Pakt ist in der letzten Zeit jedoch immer mehr in die Kritik geraten und seine Reform steht kurz bevor. Der Grad der Überlegenheit einer Regelbindung gegenüber diskretionären – ad hoc – Entscheidungen hängt dabei davon ab, ob die Regel hinreichend definiert ist und ob sie bestimmten Anforderungen genügt. Eine Analyse des Pakts im Spiegel der relevanten Kriterien zeigt, dass er diesbezüglich deutliche Schwächen hat. Hinzu kommt, dass die bisherigen Reformvorschläge diese Schwächen nicht nur ebenfalls aufweisen, sondern sogar neue begründen. Den diskutierten Vorschlägen ist eines gemeinsam: Damit die Finanzpolitik wieder in der Lage ist, eingegangene Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen – wodurch sie vordergründig an Glaubwürdigkeit zurückgewönne – werden die Anforderungen gesenkt. Eine Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Finanzen wird mit diesem Vorgehen allerdings nicht befördert. Vor diesem Hintergrund plädiert das IWH erneut für die Implementierung eines Ausgabenpfades, der sich dem Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt als deutlich überlegen erweist.
Read article
Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
Read article
Cross-border Banking and Transmission Mechanisms in Europe: Evidence from German Data
Claudia M. Buch
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 16,
2004
Abstract
International activities of commercial banks play a potential role for the transmission of shocks across countries. This paper presents stylized facts of the integration of European banking markets and analyses the potential of banks to transmit shocks across countries. Although the openness of banking systems has increased, bilateral financial linkages among EU countries are relatively small. The exceptions are claims of German banks on a number of smaller countries. These data are used for an analysis of the determinants of cross-border lending patterns.
Read article
Investitions- und Finanzierungsverhalten Multinationaler Unternehmen
Holger Zemanek
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 197,
2004
Abstract
Seit einigen Jahren können internationale Handels- und Kapitalströme den beobachteten internationalen Konjunkturverbund – insbesondere zwischen den USA und Europa – nicht mehr hinreichend erklären. So hat sich beispielsweise der in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren bestehende enge Konjunkturzusammenhang zwischen Italien, Frankreich sowie Deutschland auf der einen und den USA auf der anderen in den 1990er Jahren aufgelöst, obwohl sich die Handelsverflechtungen zwischen diesen Ländern keinesfalls verringerten.
Read article
Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the rare animal?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
2004
Abstract
Although domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the financial services industry have increased steadily over the past two decades, international M&As were until recently relatively rare. Moreover, the share of cross-border mergers in the banking industry is low compared with other industries. This paper uses a novel dataset of over 3000 mergers that took place between 1985 and 2001 to analyze the determinants of international bank mergers. We test the extent to which information costs and regulations hold back merger activity. Our results suggest that information costs significantly impede cross-border bank mergers. Regulations also influence cross-border bank merger activity. Hence, policy makers can create environments that encourage cross-border activity, but information cost barriers must be overcome even in (legally) integrated markets.
Read article
Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
Read article
Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
Read article
Investment, Financial Markets, New Economy Dynamics and Growth in Transition Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, P. J. J. Welfens
Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia: Finance, Trade, Market Institutions, and Energy,
2004
Abstract
The transition to a market economy in the former CMEA area is more than a decade old and one can clearly distinguish a group of relatively fast growing countries — including Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia — and a majority of slowly growing economies, including Russia and the Ukraine. Initial problems of transition were natural in the sense that systemic transition to a market economy has effectively destroyed part of the existing capital stock that was no longer profitable under the new relative prices imported from world markets; and there was a transitory inflationary push as low state-administered prices were replaced by higher market equilibrium prices. Indeed, systemic transformation in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have brought serious transitory inflation problems and a massive transition recession; negative growth rates have continued over many years in some countries, including Russia and the Ukraine, where output growth was negative throughout the 1990s (except for Russia, which recorded slight growth in 1997). For political and economic reasons the economic performance of Russia is of particular relevance for the success of the overall transition process. If Russia would face stagnation and instability, this would undermine political and economic stability in the whole of Europe and prospects for integrating Russia into the world economy.
Read article
Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?
Claudia M. Buch
Journal of Money Credit,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones. Using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks, I empirically determine the impact of information, costs and regulations, and I isolate intra-EU financial linkages. I confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks, but their relative importance differs among countries.
Read article