Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Analysis of statements made in favour of and against the adoption of competition law in developing and transition economies
Johannes Stephan, Franz Kronthaler, Frank Emmert
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
No. 9,
2005
Abstract
The paper is concerned with documenting and assessing statements made by policymakers, opinion formers, and other stakeholders in favour and against the adoption of competition laws with particular reference to transition and developing countries which have not yet enacted these kind of laws. For example, claims that competition enforcement might reduce the inflow of foreign direct investment, or that other policies are successfully used as substitutes for competition law, are assessed. In a first step, the method of generalized analysis structures the list of statements around core issues of common features to make them accessible to further interpretation and assessment. The paper shows that some claims are in fact country or region specific, and specific to the development level of the respective countries. In a second step, the core issues are assessed according to economic and legal criteria. Since the analysis focuses on transition and developing countries, the criteria for economic assessment are predominantly economic growth and development issues, but also include the economic coherency of a set of claims submitted by stakeholders in a given country. The criteria for legal assessment include whether claims are problematic in light of WTO-principles, or are even born out of a political objective which is incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter of WTO-rules.
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Economic forecast 2005: German economy gradually accelerating
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
In der Weltwirtschaft wirken die geldpolitischen
Rahmenbedingungen weiterhin anregend. Die
Ertragslage der Unternehmen ist gut – mit ein
Grund für die recht positive Entwicklung an den
Aktienmärkten in Amerika und in Europa. Die
Voraussetzungen für die Fortsetzung des weltwirtschaftlichen
Aufschwungs sind von dieser Seite
günstig, wenngleich die Unsicherheiten über die
künftige Entwicklung von Ölpreis und Dollarwert
geblieben sind...
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Determinants and Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data
Claudia M. Buch, J. Kleinert, A. Lipponer
Economic Policy,
No. 41,
2005
Abstract
Foreign direct investment is an essential aspect of ‘globalization’ yet its empirical determinants are not well understood. What we do know is based either on poor data for a wide range of nations, or good data for the US and Swedish cases. In this paper, we provide evidence on the determinants of the activities of German multinational firms by using a newly available firm-level data set from the Deutsche Bundesbank. The specific goal of this paper is to demonstrate the relative role of country-level and firm-level determinants of foreign direct investment. We focus on three main questions: First, what are the main driving forces of German firms’ multinational activities? Second, is there evidence that sector-level and firm-level factors shape internationalization patterns? Third, is there evidence of agglomeration effects in the foreign activities of German firms? We find that the market access motive for internationalization dominates. Firms move abroad mainly to gain better access to large foreign markets. Cost-saving motives, however, are important for some manufacturing sectors. Our results strongly suggest that firm-level heterogeneity has an important influence on internationalization patterns – as stressed by recent models of international trade. We also find positive agglomeration effects for the activities of German firms that stem from the number of other German firms that are active on a given foreign market. In terms of lessons for economic policy, our results show that lowering barriers to the integration of markets and encouraging the formation of human capital can promote the activities of multinational firms. However, our results related to the heterogeneity of firms and agglomeration tendencies show that it might be difficult to fine-tune policies directed at the exploitation of synergies and at the creation of clusters of foreign firms.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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Business Cycle Volatility in Germany
Claudia M. Buch, J. Doepke, C. Pierdzioch
German Economic Review,
2004
Abstract
Stylized facts suggest that output volatility in OECD countries has declined in recent years. The causes and the nature of this decline have so far been analyzed mainly for the United States. In this paper, we analyze whether structural changes in output volatility in Germany can be detected. We report evidence that output volatility has declined in Germany. It is difficult to answer the question whether this decline in output volatility reflects good economic and monetary policy or merely ‘good luck’.
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IWH forecast of economic activity: Lack of investment slows growth of domestic demand in Germany
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2004
Abstract
Das Statistische Bundesamt hat seine ersten Berechnungen zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt und zu seinen Komponenten für das zweite Quartal 2004 vorgelegt und die bisherigen Ergebnisse für die zurückliegenden Vierteljahre überarbeitet – Anlass für eine Überprüfung der Konjunkturprognose des IWH. Laut amtlicher Neuberechnung für die ersten drei Monate des Jahres fiel die konjunkturelle Spaltung zwischen Auslands- und Inlandsnachfrage in Deutschland noch deutlicher aus als ursprünglich gemeldet, und diese Schere hat sich in den Monaten April bis Juni nicht verringert. Die Anpassung der Prognosewerte für das zweite Halbjahr, die dominiert wird von einer Aufwärtskorrektur des außenwirtschaftlichen Beitrags zur gesamtwirtschaftlichen Produktion, hat eine Erhöhung der Wachstumsprognose des Bruttoinlandsprodukts für dieses Jahr von 1,8% auf 2% zur Folge. Im Zuge der Verlangsamung des weltwirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs wird der konjunkturelle Impuls aus dem Ausland im weiteren Verlauf dieses und des nächsten Jahres an Stärke verlieren. Dafür gewinnt die Inlandsnachfrage wieder etwas an Schwung. Voraussetzung ist, dass die Unternehmen ihre Investitionszurückhaltung aufgeben und die über die Außenwirtschaft erzielten Gewinne in den Wirtschaftskreislauf zurückführen. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird 2005 um 1,8% höher als in diesem Jahr sein. Ohne Arbeitstageeffekt ergibt sich infolge des – wenn auch nur zögerlichen – Übergreifens der Konjunktur auf die Binnennachfrage ein Anstieg um 2%, nach 1,5% in diesem Jahr.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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The economic situation and development in the German regions along the border with Poland
Gerhard Heimpold
Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
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