Loan Securitisation during the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
VoxEU CEPR,
May
2023
Abstract
Banks play a crucial role in the transition to a low-carbon economy, but they also expose themselves to climate transition risk. This column shows that banks use corporate loan securitisation to shift climate transition risk to less-regulated shadow banking entities. This behaviour affects carbon premia in loan contracts. When banks can use securitisation to manage transition risk, their climate policies that target only activities reflected in their books may not be as effective as bank regulators hope for.
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Natural Disasters and Bank Stability: Evidence from the U.S. Financial System
Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
May
2023
Abstract
We show that weather-related natural disasters in the United States significantly weaken the financial stability of banks with business activities in affected regions. This is reflected in higher probabilities of default, lower z-scores, higher non-performing assets ratios, higher foreclosure ratios, lower returns on assets and lower equity ratios of affected banks in the years following a natural disaster. The effects are economically relevant and highlight the financial vulnerability of banks and their borrowers despite insurances and public aid programs.
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Short-Selling Threats and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Financial Crisis
Dien Giau Bui, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Hong Thoa Nguyen
Journal of Banking and Finance,
May
2023
Abstract
The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.
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14.02.2023 • 4/2023
Study on Europe's top bankers: Risky business despite bonus cap
Ten years ago, the EU Parliament decided to cap the flexible remuneration of bank managers. But the cap on bonuses misses its target: Managers of systemically important European banks take high risks without changes, shows a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test
Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena, Cosimo Pancaro
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2023
Abstract
Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.
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Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 22,
2022
Abstract
We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.
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Social Capital, Trusting, and Trustworthiness: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending
Iftekhar Hasan, Qing He, Haitian Lu
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.
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Climate Change-Related Regulatory Risks and Bank Lending
Isabella Müller, Eleonora Sfrappini
ECB Working Paper,
No. 2670,
2022
Abstract
We identify the effect of climate change-related regulatory risks on credit real-location. Our evidence suggests that effects depend borrower's region. Following an increase in salience of regulatory risks, banks reallocate credit to US firms that could be negatively impacted by regulatory interventions. Conversely, in Europe, banks lend more to firms that could benefit from environmental regulation. The effect is moderated by banks' own loan portfolio composition. Banks with a portfolio tilted towards firms that could be negatively a affected by environmental policies increasingly support these firms. Overall, our results indicate that financial implications of regulation associated with climate change appear to be the main drivers of banks' behavior.
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Understanding Post-Covid Inflation Dynamics
Martín Harding, Jesper Lindé, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the Post-Covid period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroscedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is high.
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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
Carola Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2022
Abstract
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
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