15.03.2018 • 3/2018
Consistently strong economy, but risks are increasing
The global upswing continues in 2018. The German economy is cur-rently in a boom and is increasingly coming up against capacity limits. “According to our forecast, gross domestic product will expand by 2.2% in 2018; the general government surplus will amount to 1.1% in relation to gross domestic product. Economic growth in East Germany is likely to be slightly below the German growth rate”, says Oliver Holtemöller, head of the Department Macroeconomics and IWH vice president.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Real Effects of Bank Capital Regulations: Global Evidence
Yota D. Deli, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2017
Abstract
We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.
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From World Factory to World Investor: The New Way of China Integrating into the World
Bijun Wang, Xiang Li
China Economic Journal,
No. 2,
2017
Abstract
This paper argues that outward direct investment (ODI) is replacing international trade as the new way China integrates into the world. Based on two complementary datasets, we document the pattern of Chinese ODI. We argue that the rapid growth of China’s ODI is the result of strong economic development, increasing domestic constraints, and supportive government policies. Compared with trade integration, investment integration involves China more deeply in global business. As a new global investor, China’s ODI in the future is full of opportunities, risks, and challenges. The Chinese government should improve bureaucracy coordination and participate more in designing and maintaining international rules to protect ODI interests.
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The Macroeconomic Risks of Undesirably Low Inflation
Jonas Arias, Christopher J. Erceg, Mathias Trabandt
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
This paper investigates the macroeconomic risks associated with undesirably low inflation using a medium-sized New Keynesian model. We consider different causes of persistently low inflation, including a downward shift in long-run inflation expectations, a fall in nominal wage growth, and a favorable supply-side shock. We show that the macroeconomic effects of persistently low inflation depend crucially on its underlying cause, as well as on the extent to which monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. Finally, we discuss policy options to mitigate these effects.
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Brexit (Probability) and Effects on Financial Market Stability
Thomas Krause, Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
IWH Online,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
On 23 June 2016, there will be a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) on the stay of the country in the European Union (EU). Based on recent poll data, the share of supporters and opponents of an exit varies around 50%. Opponents of the UK breaking up with Brussels („Brexit“) refer to high costs in terms of stagnating economic growth if the UK leaves the EU. The risk of reduced trade, declining foreign direct investment, and a lower degree of financial market integration is high following an exit of the “single market”.
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Unsupported Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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