Political Institutionalisation and Governance of the German Metropolitan Regions: A Comparative Study
Peter Franz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
Mit der Bildung von Metropolregionen versuchen Städte und Kreise auf Anforderungen des globalen Standortwettbewerbes zu reagieren. Damit zeichnen sich neue Formen großflächiger interkommunaler Kooperation ab. In Deutschland sind in raumentwicklungspolitischer Absicht elf solcher Metropolregionen definiert und Anstöße zu ihrer Konstituierung gegeben worden. Um ihre politische Institutionalisierung bemühen sich die regionalen Akteure mit unterschiedlichem Erfolg, schlagen dabei aber zum Teil ähnliche Wege ein. In der vorliegenden
Studie werden die deutschen Metropolregionen mit Hilfe eines Stufenmodells der politischen Institutionalisierung diesbezüglich miteinander verglichen. Dabei wird auch der Einfluss intervenierender Faktoren wie der poly- bzw. monozentrischen Siedlungsstruktur sowie der Existenz von Ländergrenzen in diesen Regionen untersucht. Die Untersuchung kommt zum Ergebnis, dass bisher nur wenige Metropolregionen das Stadium fortgeschrittener Institutionalisierung und damit auch Kooperation erreicht haben. Eine Best-Practice-Empfehlung lässt sich
den eingeschlagenen Institutionalisierungspfaden bisher nicht entnehmen. Der Konstituierungsprozess zeichnet sich derzeit noch durch hohe Dynamik aus, sodass eine Wiederholung der Studie in den nächsten Jahren angezeigt erscheint.
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Municipality Size and Efficiency of Local Public Services: Does Size Matter?
Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy, L. Schreier
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2011
published in: FinanzArchiv
Abstract
Similarly to western Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, the eastern part of Germany has experienced a still ongoing process of numerous amalgamations among counties, towns and municipalities since the mid-1990s. The evidence in the economic literature is mixed with regard to the claimed expenditure reductions and efficiency gains from municipal mergers. We therefore analyze the global efficiency of the municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt, for the first time in this context, using a double-bootstrap procedure combining DEA and truncated regression. This allows including environmental variables to control for exogenous determinants of municipal efficiency. Our focus thereby is on institutional and fiscal variables. Moreover, the scale efficiency is estimated to find out whether large units are necessary to benefit from scale economies. In contrast to previous studies, we chose the aggregate budget of municipal associations (“Verwaltungsgemeinschaften”) as the object of our analysis since important competences of the member municipalities are settled on a joint administrative level. Furthermore, we use a data set that has been carefully adjusted for bookkeeping items and transfers within the communal level. On the “eve” of a mayor municipal reform the majority of the municipalities were found to have an approximately scale-efficient size and centralized organizational forms (“Einheitsgemeinden”) showed no efficiency advantage over municipal associations.
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Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case
A. Yakovlev, A. Govorun
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2011
Abstract
International lessons from emerging economies suggest that business associations may provide an effective channel of communication between the government and the private sector. This function of business associations may become still more important in transition economies, where old mechanisms for coordinating enterprise activities have been destroyed, while the new ones have not been established yet. In this context, Russian experience is a matter of interest, because for a long time, Russia was regarded as a striking example of state failures and market failures. Consequently, the key point of our study was a description of the role and place of business associations in the presentday
Russian economy and their interaction with member companies and bodies of state
administration. Relying on the survey data of 957 manufacturing firms conducted in
2009, we found that business associations are more frequently joined by larger companies, firms located in regional capital cities, and firms active in investment and innovation. By contrast, business associations tend to be less frequently joined by business groups’ subsidiaries and firms that were non-responsive about their respective ownership structures. Our regression analysis has also confirmed that business associations are a component of what Frye (2002) calls an “elite exchange”– although only on regional and local levels. These “exchanges” imply that members of business associations, on the one hand, more actively assist regional and local authorities in social development of their regions, and on the other hand more often receive support from authorities. However, this effect is insignificant in terms of support from the federal government. In general, our results allow us to believe that at present, business associations (especially the
industry-wide and “leading” ones) consolidate the most active, advanced companies and act as collective representatives of their interests. For this reason, business associations can be regarded as interface units between the authorities and businesses and as a possible instrument for promotion of economic development.
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What are the Long-Term Benefits of the Economic Stimulus Package II for German Local Governments? – The Case of Saxony
Peter Haug
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht, ob von den im Rahmen des Konjunkturpakets II geförderten Investitionen neben den kurzfristigen Nachfrageeffekten auch langfristige Auswirkungen z. B. auf das lokale Wirtschaftswachstum zu erwarten sind. Was die kurzfristigen Auswirkungen betrifft, so zeigte sich am Beispiel Sachsens mit relativ geringfügiger zeitlicher Verzögerung ein Anstieg der kommunalen Investitionen. Das Time-Lag-Problem staatlicher Ausgabenprogramme scheint sich dort in Grenzen zu halten. Erhebliche Preissteigerungen für Bauleistungen zeichnen sich bisher ebenfalls noch nicht ab. Mit Bezug auf die langfristigen Wirkungen der geförderten Maßnahmen ist aus Sicht z. B. der Neuen Wachstumstheorie Skepsis angebracht, da selbst bei typischen öffentlichen Vorleistungsgütern die Entzugseffekte der Finanzierung gegen die Produktivitätssteigerung im privaten Unternehmenssektor abzuwägen sind. Hinzu kommen generell die Faktorpreiseffekte von Investitionszuweisungen, die einen übermäßigen Einsatz von physischem Kapital in der öffentlichen Produktion begünstigen. Diese skeptische Haltung der Theorie wird für Sachsen dadurch bestärkt, dass vor allem kommunale Konsumgüter (Sport- und Freizeitanlagen) oder nicht unmittelbar wirtschaftsnahe Bildungseinrichtungen
(Kindergärten, Grundschulen) gefördert werden. Investitionen etwa in Einrichtungen der beruflichen Bildung, Forschung und Entwicklung oder unternehmensrelevante Infrastrukturarten spielen entweder auf kommunaler Ebene keine nennenswerte Rolle oder sind explizit von der Förderung ausgeschlossen. Insbesondere aufgrund der Anreize zur Fehllenkung von öffentlichen Ressourcen wird empfohlen, künftige Förderprogramme eher als zweckungebundene Transferleistungen auszugestalten, die die Kommunen dann nach eigenem Ermessen für „Investitionen“ in Humankapital (Personaleinstellungen
oder Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen) oder in Realkapital verwenden können.
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Municipal Enterprises as Shadow Budgets – How do they Affect the Actual Budgetary Situation of Germany´s Local Governments?
Peter Haug
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
Die Verlagerung kommunaler Aufgaben aus dem Kernhaushalt auf kommunale Unternehmen verzerrt immer mehr die Wahrnehmung der tatsächlichen Vermögens-, Finanz- und Ertragslage der Kommunen in Deutschland. Überangebot- und -nachfrage bei öffentlichen Leistungen als Folge dieser „Fiskalillusion“ sind eine mögliche Gefahr jener Entwicklung. Der Beitrag versucht daher, am Beispiel der kreisfreien Städte durch die simultane Analyse ausgewählter Kennzahlen für Kernhaushalt und kommunale Unternehmen eine differenziertere Darstellung der Haushaltssituation zu leisten. Außerdem werden die methodischen Probleme derartiger Berechnungen verdeutlicht. Unter Berücksichtigung dieser Nebenhaushalte erhöhen sich z. B. die Pro-Kopf-Einnahmen, -Investitionen und -Schulden im gesamtdeutschen Durchschnitt um ein Drittel bis 50%. Dagegen entfallen 75% der kommunalen Beschäftigten weiterhin auf den Kernhaushalt. Der Auslagerungsgrad der Ausgaben für bestimmte freiwillige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben ist mit durchschnittlich 22% zwar noch relativ gering, doch zeichnet sich auch hier eine steigende Tendenz ab. Die Untersuchung liefert zudem Hinweise auf signifikante Unterschiede zwischen ost- und westdeutschen Städten. Dazu zählen die größere Ertragskraft kommunaler Unternehmen sowie die höhere Pro-Kopf-Verschuldung und die höheren Ausgaben in den Bereichen Kultur, Sport, Freizeit und Wissenschaft in Ostdeutschland. Bei der Ergebnisinterpretation sind allerdings gewisse Unzulänglichkeiten der amtlichen Statistik zu beachten. So ist beispielsweise keine vollständige Bereinigung um interne Zahlungsströme möglich. Außerdem können indirekte kommunale Mehrheitsbeteiligungen sowie die kommunalen Sparkassen nicht berücksichtigt werden. Insgesamt bleibt abzuwarten, ob die eingeleiteten Reformen zur Einführung der Doppik im kommunalen Haushaltswesen helfen, dem Idealziel eines aussagefähigen „Konzernabschlusses“ für den „Konzern Stadt“ näherzukommen.
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On the Economics of Ex-Post Transfers in a Federal State: A Mechanism Design Approach
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
WWDP, 95,
No. 95,
2008
Abstract
As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.
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Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany
Peter Haug
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2007
Abstract
The paper deals with the effects of local governments’ interference with business affairs of publicly owned utilities. A partial model is presented to illustrate the consequences of “democratic control” for the public managers’ effort and the efficiency of local public production. To check the theoretical results empirically, a two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) is carried out for a sample of East German water suppliers. The organisational form is used as a measure for the degree of municipal control. The results of the OLS- and Tobit regression indicate an efficiency-enhancing effect of organisational forms with less distinctive control options for local politicians.
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Local Public Utilities' Profits and Municipal Expenses in Germany: An Empirical Analysis
Peter Haug, Birger Nerré
Proceedings of the 99th Annual Conference on Taxation (November 16-18), Washington DC,
2006
Abstract
The article offers information on profits and municipal expenses of local public utilities in Germany. It reveals that cities and municipalities faced rising expenses over the last years and the only way for local governments to avoid budgetary bottlenecks is to postpone infrastructure investment and increase short-term borrowing. The countries municipalities tried to overcome such difficulties by increasing local public utilities' profits.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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