Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is constructed, how it works, how to keep it fit and what good a bit of chocolate can do. Dossier In…
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The Political Economy of the European Banking Union
The Political Economy of the European Banking Union Junior Professorship Lena Tonzer, PhD: The Political Economy of the European Banking Union: Causes for National Differences in…
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Privacy
Data Protection Policy We take the protection of your personal data very seriously and treat your personal data with confidentiality and in compliance with the provisions of law…
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Loose (Interview)
When there were almost no flats in Halle yet ... Brigitte Loose about IWH's foundation and development Ms Loose, how did you experience the early days of IWH? Looking back, it was…
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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Speed Projects
Speed Projects On this page, you will find the IWH EXplore Speed Projects in chronologically descending order. 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2021 SPEED 2021/01…
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Projects
Our Projects 07.2022 ‐ 12.2026 Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme On behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, the IWH and the RWI…
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Poison Bonds
Shuo Xia, Rex Wang Renjie
SSRN Discussion Paper,
2023
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of "poison bonds", which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% after 2005. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Further analyses suggest that this practice entrenches incumbent managers, coincidentally benefits bondholders, but destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for understanding the agency benefits and costs of debt: (1) more debt does not necessarily discipline the management; and (2) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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People
People Job Market Candidates Doctoral Students PhD Representatives Alumni Supervisors Lecturers Coordinators Job Market Candidates Tommaso Bighelli Job market paper: "The…
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Lecturers
Lecturers at CGDE Institutions Jordan Adamson Assistant Professor at Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Leipzig University. Website Course: Econometrics (winter term…
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