Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Crossing Networks Competition and Design
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
In the past two decades, Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) started to compete with traditional exchanges. Our paper focuses on one such system: a Crossing Network (CN). First, we discuss the distinct institutional aspects a CN offers compared to traditional markets. Next, we present an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature analyzing their success in competing with traditional markets. Finally, we offer some prospects on the potential outcome of this competition, taking into account market design issues such as the optimal degree of transparency of CNs. We also provide a market practioner’s view on the market design of CNs.
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19.06.2006 • 18/2006
Hartz IV optimieren
Wahrheiten sind oft unbequem und man möchte sie lieber verdrängen. Und so scheint es auch mit Hartz-IV zu sein. Hat Hartz-IV seit 2005 Menschen arm gemacht, die vorher nicht arm waren oder wird jetzt nur das ganze Ausmaß der relativen Armut in Deutschland transparent, das bereits seit mehreren Jahren bestand, aber der Politik und der Öffentlichkeit nicht bewußt war oder nicht bewußt sein wollte? Hartz-IV hat keine neue Armut gebracht. Sicher, einige stehen etwas schlechter als vor dem ALG-II, vorwiegend Bezieher der Arbeitslosenhilfe, während sich Bezieher der früheren Sozialhilfe, etwas besser stellen – aber für die überwiegende Mehrzahl dürfte sich die finanzielle Lage nicht dramatisch verändert haben. Was also ist neu oder dramatisch an Hartz-IV?
Herbert Buscher
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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New labor market results: More transparency of labor market policy measures
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Gabriele Hardt, Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2002
Abstract
Im Beitrag wird die modifizierte Arbeitsmarktbilanz des IWH am Beispiel Ostdeutschlands beschrieben. In ihr werden neuere arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen explizit ausgewiesen. Damit wird das Ausmaß der Unterbeschäftigung vollständiger und transparenter ausgewiesen.
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