Deriving the Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk with a Compound Option Approach: The Case of Kazakhstan
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Discussion paper, Series 2: Banking and financial studies, No. 01/2010,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term default risk to each maturity. Applying the Duan (1994) maximum likelihood approach, we find for Kazakhstan that the overall crisis probability was mainly driven by short-term risk, which increased from 25% in March 2007 to 80% in December 2008. Concurrently, the long-term default risk increased from 20% to only 25% during the same period.
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Market Concentration and Innovation in Transnational Corporations: Evidence from Foreign Affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe
Liviu Voinea, Johannes Stephan
Research on Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalization (Progress in International Business Research, Volume 4),
2009
Abstract
Purpose – The main research question of this contribution is whether local market concentration influences R&D and innovation activities of foreign affiliates of transnational companies.
Methodology/approach – We focus on transition economies and use discriminant function analysis to investigate differences in the innovation activity of foreign affiliates operating in concentrated markets, compared to firms operating in nonconcentrated markets. The database consists of the results of a questionnaire administered to a representative sample of foreign affiliates in a selection of five transition economies.
Findings – We find that foreign affiliates in more concentrated markets, when compared to foreign affiliates in less concentrated markets, export more to their own foreign investor's network, do more basic and applied research, use more of the existing technology already incorporated in the products of their own foreign investor's network, do less process innovation, and acquire less knowledge from abroad.
Research limitations/implications – The results may be specific to transition economies only.
Practical implications – The main implications of these results are that host country market concentration stimulates intranetwork knowledge diffusion (with a risk of transfer pricing), while more intense competition stimulates knowledge creation (at least as far as process innovation is concerned) and knowledge absorption from outside the affiliates' own network. Policy makers should focus their support policies on companies in more competitive sectors, as they are more likely to transfer new technologies.
Originality/value – It contributes to the literature on the relationship between market concentration and innovation, based on a unique survey database of foreign affiliates of transnational corporations operating in Eastern Europe.
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Margins of international banking: Is there a productivity pecking order in banking, too?
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 12/2009,
2009
Abstract
Modern trade theory emphasizes firm-level productivity differentials to explain
the cross-border activities of non-financial firms. This study tests whether a
productivity pecking order also determines international banking activities. Using
a novel dataset that contains all German banks’ international activities, we
estimate the ordered probability of a presence abroad (extensive margin) and the
volume of international assets (intensive margin). Methodologically, we enrich the
conventional Heckman selection model to account for the self-selection of banks
into different modes of foreign activities using an ordered probit. Four main
findings emerge. First, similar to results for non-financial firms, a productivity
pecking order drives bank internationalization. Second, only a few non-financial
firms engage in international trade, but many banks hold international assets, and
only a few large banks engage in foreign direct investment. Third, in addition to
productivity, risk factors matter for international banking. Fourth, gravity-type
variables have an important impact on international banking activities.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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A Simple Macro Model of Original Sin based on Optimal Price Setting under Incomplete Information
Axel Lindner
International Economics and Economic Policy,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses the consequences of “original sin“ (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) for macroeconomic stability. The approach is based on third-generation models of currency crises, but differs from alternative versions by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and there is incomplete information about the future exchange rate. It is shown that a small depreciation is beneficial, but a large one is detrimental.
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Growth, Employment, Poverty Alleviation and Institutional Development – Lessons from Country Cases – An Introduction
Tobias Knedlik, Karl Wohlmuth
African Development Perspectives Yearbook, No. 14,
2009
Abstract
Economic growth is a central concept in judging the progress of economic development. Since the early years of economic sciences, economists aim to explain the differences in the production of goods and services among economies. Economic policy focuses on economic growth as the basis for the well-being of nations. The simple idea is that the extension of the productive capacity and finally the increase of consumption possibilities in an economy is the basis of all policies aiming to increase a nation’s welfare. It is therefore not surprising that aims of development policy are often linked to specific economic growth targets. So the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals are assumed only to be achieved if a certain level of economic growth can be reached.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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Openness and Growth: The Long Shadow of the Berlin Wall
Claudia M. Buch, Farid Toubal
Journal of Macroeconomics,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
The question whether international openness causes higher domestic growth has been subject to intense discussions in the empirical growth literature. This paper addresses the issue in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. We analyze whether the slow convergence in per capita incomes between East and West Germany and the lower international openness of East Germany are linked. We address the endogeneity of openness by adapting the methodology proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) to a panel framework. We instrument openness with time-invariant exogenous geographic variables and time-varying exogenous policy variables. We also distinguish the impact of different channels of integration. Our paper has three main findings. First, geographic variables have a significant impact on regional openness. Second, controlling for geography, East German states are less integrated into international markets along all dimensions of integration considered. Third, the degree of openness for trade has a positive impact on regional income per capita.
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Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy
Axel Lindner
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: Communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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