Stages of the Ongoing Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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asset price inflation
Tobias Knedlik, A. Knorr
Systeme monetärer Steuerung - Analyse und Vergleich geldpolitischer Strategien - Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Band 86,
No. 86,
2007
Abstract
Es ist den wichtigsten Notenbanken in den vergangenen beiden Jahrzehnten sehr erfolgreich gelungen, die Inflationsrate dauerhaft auf einem sehr niedrigen Niveau zu stabilisieren. Im gleichen Zeitraum stiegen allerdings die Preise vieler Vermögensgüter erheblich an. Wirtschaftspolitisch problematisch wäre diese Entwicklung allerdings nur, wenn dieser rapide Preisanstieg nicht nur Veränderungen der Fundamentalfaktoren widerspiegelt, sondern im Wesentlichen auf spekulative Übertreibungen zurückzuführen ist. Die Zahl spekulativer Blasen hat in der jüngeren Vergangenheit nachweislich zugenommen. Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, den wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsbedarf bei Vermögenspreisinflationen zu ermitteln. Dazu werden die relevanten Märkte für Assetgüter identifiziert, die Grundlagen der Preisbildung auf diesen Märkten herausgearbeitet, unter Berücksichtigung der jeweiligen Übertragungsmechanismen die möglichen Auswirkungen von Vermögenspreisinflationen auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung diskutiert, die Eignung der Geldpolitik sowie alternativer wirtschaftspolitischer Instrumente zur Abwehr solcher gesamtwirtschaftlicher Störungen erörtert, die aus einer Vermögenspreisinflation herrühren. Wie sich zeigt, lässt sich einer inflationären Entwicklung der Preise von Vermögensgütern, einmal in Gang gekommen, mit dem Instrumentarium der Geldpolitik kaum noch wirksam begegnen. Umso größere Bedeutung kommt deshalb den verfügbaren wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsalternativen zu: der genauen Analyse des monetären Umfelds und, damit eng verknüpft, einer offensiven Informationspolitik seitens der Notenbank, verbesserte aufsichtsrechtliche Instrumente und die Schaffung bzw. Stärkung derjenigen Institutionen, derer es bedarf, um die mit Vermögenspreisinflationen typischerweise einhergehenden Risiken optimal diversifizieren zu können sowie den daraus ebenfalls resultierenden Strukturanpassungen zu den geringsten gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten zu bewältigen.
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Excess Volatility in European Equity Style Indices - New Evidence
Marian Berneburg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2006
Abstract
Are financial markets efficient? One proposition that seems to contradict this is Shiller’s finding of excess volatility in asset prices and its resulting rejection of the discounted cash flow model. This paper replicates Shiller’s approach for a different data set and extends his analysis by testing for a long-run relationship by means of a cointegration analysis. Contrary to previous studies, monthly data for an integrated European stock market is being used, with special attention to equity style investment strategies. On the basis of this analysis’ results, Shiller’s findings seem questionable. While a long-run relationship between prices and dividends can be observed for all equity styles, a certain degree, but to a much smaller extent than in Shiller’s approach, of excess volatility cannot be rejected. But it seems that a further relaxation of Shiller’s assumptions would completely eliminate the finding of an overly strong reaction of prices to changes in dividends. Two interesting side results are, that all three investment styles seem to have equal performance when adjusting for risk, which by itself is an indication for efficiency and that market participants seem to use current dividend payments from one company as an indication for future dividend payments by other firms. Overall the results of this paper lead to the conclusion that efficiency cannot be rejected for an integrated European equity market.
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Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
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