How does Institutional Setting Affect the Impact of EU Structural Funds on Economic Cohesion? New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe
Marina Grusevaja, Toralf Pusch
Abstract
Structural Funds are the main instrument of the EU cohesion policy. Their effective use is subject to an ongoing debate in political and scientific circles. European fiscal assistance under this heading should promote economic and social cohesion in the member states of the European Union. Recently, the domestic institutional capacity to absorb, to distribute and to invest Structural Funds effectively has become a crucial determinant of the cohesion process and has attracted attention of the scientific community. The aim of this study is to shed light on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the countries of the first Central and Eastern European enlargement round in 2004. Using regional data for these countries, we have a look on the impact of several institutional governance variables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds. In the interpretation of results, reference is
made to regional economics. Results of the empirical analysis indicate an influence of certain institutional variables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the new member states.
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Governmental Learning as a Determinant of Economic Growth
Marina Grusevaja
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 23,
2010
Abstract
Systemic economic transition is a process of determined radical institutional change, a process of building new institutions required by a market economy. Nowadays, the experience of transition countries with the implementation of new institutions could be reviewed as a method of economic development that despite similar singular steps has different effects on the domestic economic performance. The process of institutional change towards a market economy is determined by political will, thus the government plays an important role in carrying out the economic reforms. Among the variety of outcomes and effects the attention is drawn especially to economic growth that diverges significantly in different post-transition countries. The paper attempts to shed light upon the problem on the basis of institutional economics, of economics of innovation and partially of political economy of growth using an evolutionary, process-oriented perspective. In this context the issue central to the promotion of economic growth is the successful implementation of new institutions through governmental activities. The paper shows that under the conditions of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty economic growth is determined, inter alia, by the capacity for governmental learning.
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The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, J. T. Addison, T. Kuhn
IZA Discussion Papers, No. 5170,
No. 5170,
2010
Abstract
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
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Corporate Governance in the Multinational Enterprise: A Financial Contracting Perspective
Diemo Dietrich, Björn Jindra
International Business Review,
2010
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring economics-based finance research more into the focus of international business theory. On the basis of an analytical model that introduces financial constraints into incomplete contracting in an international vertical trade relationship, we propose an integrated framework that facilitates the study of the interdependencies between internalisation decisions, firm-internal allocations of control rights, and the debt capacity of firms. We argue that the financial constraint of an MNE and/or its supplier should be considered as an important determinant of internal governance structures, complementary to, and interacting with, institutional factors and proprietary knowledge.
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Growth, Employment, Poverty Alleviation and Institutional Development – Lessons from Country Cases – An Introduction
Tobias Knedlik, Karl Wohlmuth
African Development Perspectives Yearbook, No. 14,
2009
Abstract
Economic growth is a central concept in judging the progress of economic development. Since the early years of economic sciences, economists aim to explain the differences in the production of goods and services among economies. Economic policy focuses on economic growth as the basis for the well-being of nations. The simple idea is that the extension of the productive capacity and finally the increase of consumption possibilities in an economy is the basis of all policies aiming to increase a nation’s welfare. It is therefore not surprising that aims of development policy are often linked to specific economic growth targets. So the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals are assumed only to be achieved if a certain level of economic growth can be reached.
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Industry Level Technology Gaps and Complementary Knowledge Stocks as Determinants of Intra-MNC Knowledge Flows
Björn Jindra, Johannes Stephan
East-West Journal of Economics and Business,
1 & 2
2005
Abstract
Pursuing a subsidiary level analysis, we this paper tests the ‘technology gap’ hypothesis in the context of intra-MNC knowledge flows. Furthermore, it introduces complementary knowledge stocks into the concept of absorptive capacity. A set of hypotheses is tested in sample 434 foreign subsidiaries based in Central and East Europe. We find partial support for the ‘technology gap’ hypothesis applied at industry level. Furthermore, subsidiaries’ complementary knowledge stocks increase the probability for corresponding knowledge inflows from the foreign parent.
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Inherited and emerging absorptive capacities of firms and growth prospects in Estonia
Marianne Paasi
Forschungsreihe,
No. 3,
1998
Abstract
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