Are Botswana and Mozambique ready for CMA enlargement?
Tobias Knedlik
Botswana Journal of Economics,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The paper elaborates on the appropriateness of a potentially enlarged Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa including Botswana and Mozambique. The theory of optimum currency areas including some extensions by accounting for costs of non-integration and considering the external relations of currency areas are presented. Various indicators such as the structure of the economies, interest rates, inflation rates, exchange rates, factor mobility and trading partners are observed empirically. The paper concludes that current changes in the exchange rate policy of Botswana are expected to lead to increasing, though already high, convergence with CMA countries. Botswana is therefore an appropriate candidate for CMA enlargement. Mozambique is converging towards South Africa but still remains on a lower level. Taking into account the costs of non-integration, however, the target of integration should be formulated for the medium term.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Macroeconomic Modelling of the German Economy in the Framework of Euroland
Rüdiger Pohl, Heinz P. Galler
Schriften des IWH,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
An attempt to develop a new macroeconometric model for Germany is confronted with several questions that range from the general rationality of such an approach to specific problems of an appropriate model structure. One important aspect of this discussion is the introduction of the Euro as a common currency of the European monetary union. This institutional change may result in structural breaks due to changing behavior of economic agents. In addition, the definition of the spatial unit that is appropriate for modelling becomes a problem. Additional problems come from the introduction of the European Single Market and the increasing international economic integration not only within the European union but also beyond its borders. And in the case of Germany, the unification of the West and the East demand special attention. Last but not least, the harmonization of national accounting for the member states of the European Union has to be dealt with. Thus, the introduction of the Euro as a common currency is just one problem besides others that must be addressed.
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