A Simple Macro Model of Original Sin based on Optimal Price Setting under Incomplete Information
Axel Lindner
International Economics and Economic Policy,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses the consequences of “original sin“ (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) for macroeconomic stability. The approach is based on third-generation models of currency crises, but differs from alternative versions by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and there is incomplete information about the future exchange rate. It is shown that a small depreciation is beneficial, but a large one is detrimental.
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Original Sin - Analysing Its Mechanics and a proposed Remedy in a Simple Macroeconomic Model
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2006
Abstract
This paper analyses the problem of “original sin“ (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) in a simple thirdgeneration model of currency crises. The approach differs from alternative frameworks by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and the future exchange rate is uncertain. Monetary policy optimally trades off effects on price competitiveness and on debt burdens of firms. It is shown that the proposal by Eichengreen and Hausmann of creating an artificial basket currency as denominator of debt is attractive as a provision against contagion.
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Environmental policy under product differentiation and asymmetric costs - Does leapfrogging occur and is it worth it?
Jacqueline Rothfels
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 124,
2000
Abstract
This paper studies the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, domestic firms, and welfare. Point of departure is Porter’s hypothesis that unilateral environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. This hypothesis has recently received considerable support in theoretical analyses, especially if imperfectly competitive markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents are taken into account. Our work contributes to this literature by explicitely investigating the implications of asymmetric cost structures between a domestic and a foreign firm sector. We use a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation, where the consumption of a product causes environmental harm. Allowing for differentiated products, the domestic industry can either assume the market leader position or lag behind in terms of the environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming as a benchmark case that the domestic industry lags behind, we investigate the possibility of the government to induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm, i.e. a higher quality produced by the domestic firm after regulation than that of the competitor prior to regulation. It is shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm in the production process the imposition of a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to induce leapfrogging. In case of a cost disadvantage the same result can be achieved through an adequate subsidization of quality dependend production costs. Thus, careful regulation enables the domestic firm in both scenarios to better its competitive position against foreign competitors and to earn larger profits. Additionally, environmental quality and welfare can be enhanced.
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