Staying, Dropping, or Switching: The Impacts of Bank Mergers on Small Firms
Hans Degryse, Nancy Masschelein, Janet Mitchell
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
Assessing the impacts of bank mergers on small firms requires separating borrowers with single versus multiple banking relationships and distinguishing the three alternatives of “staying,” “dropping,” and “switching” of relationships. Single-relationship borrowers who “switch” to another bank following a merger will be less harmed than those whose relationship is “dropped” and not replaced. Using Belgian data, we find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks are more likely than other borrowers to be dropped. We track postmerger performance and show that many dropped target-bank borrowers are harmed by the merger. Multiple-relationship borrowers are less harmed, as they can better hedge against relationship discontinuations.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data
Hans Degryse, Patrick Van Cayseele
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
No. 1,
2000
Abstract
We investigate relationship lending using detailed contract information from nearly 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms operating within the continental European bank-based system. Specifically, we investigate the impact of different measures of relationship strength on price and nonprice terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of rent shifting by banks. The evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the loan rate increases with the duration of a bank–firm relationship. On the other hand, the scope of a relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-sensitive products from a bank, decreases the loan's interest rate substantially. Relationship duration and scope thus have opposite effects on loan rates, with the latter being more important. We also find that the collateral requirement is decreasing in the duration of the relationship and increasing in its scope.
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