Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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Bank Market Discipline and Indicators of Banking System Risk: The European Evidence
Reint E. Gropp
Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries,
2004
Abstract
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The Influence of a Heterogeneous Banking Sector on the Interbank Market Rate in the Euro Area
Ulrike Neyer, Jürgen Wiemers
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
2004
Abstract
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Standortfaktoren im Existenzgründerrating
Ulrich Blum, Werner Gleißner, A. Schaller
Existenzgründerrating,
2004
Abstract
Die Qualität eines Standorts stellt einen wesentlichen Erfolgsfaktor für ein Unternehmen dar. Wenn sich Gründer für einen Standort entscheiden, dann sollten sie daher die Eigenschaften des Orts, an dem soie sich niederlassen, sorgsam abwägen. Das moderne Rating, das zunächst aus Sicht der Banken die Fähigkeit eines Unternehmens bewertet, seinen Kapitaldienst zu leisten, und das starken Bezug auf Markt- und Wettbewerbskräfte nimmt bzw. nehmen sollte, wird hier um standörtliche Aspekte erweitert. Ein sukzessiver Filteransatz wird entwickelt, mit Hilfe dessen in der ersten Stufe die globalen Erfolgsfaktoren von Branchen herausgearbeitet werden, dann gefragt wird, welche Eigenschaften einer Wirtschaftsregion aus Sicht des Unternehmens erfolgswirksam sind und schließlich geprüft wird, welche Unternehmen oder Branchen für eine Region interessant sind. Daraus ergibt sich ein Portfolio von Möglichkeiten, das sowohl die Sicht des Unternehmens auf alternative Standorte, als auch die Sicht der Bank oder des Wirtschaftsförderers auf interessante Unternehmen schärft.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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Technological capability of foreign and West German investors in East Germany
Jutta Günther
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 189,
2004
Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for countries or regions in the process of economic catching-up since it is assumed – among other things – that FDI brings in new production technology and knowledge. This paper gives an overview about the development of FDI in East Germany based on official data provided by the Federal Bank of Germany. The investigation also includes a comparison of FDI in East Germany to Central East European countries. But the main focus of the paper is an analysis of the technological capability comparing majority foreign and West German owned firms to majority East German owned firms. It shows that foreign and West German subsidiaries in East Germany are indeed characterized by superior technological capability with respect to all indicators looked at (product innovation, research & development, organizational changes etc.).
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?
Claudia M. Buch
Journal of Money Credit,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones. Using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks, I empirically determine the impact of information, costs and regulations, and I isolate intra-EU financial linkages. I confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks, but their relative importance differs among countries.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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