Regulation and Information Costs of Sovereign Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lending Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Suk-Joong Kim, Panagiotis Politsidis, Eliza Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
October
2023
Abstract
We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.
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Internationalisation
Internationalisation The Leibniz Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH) is responsible for economic research and economic policy advice on a scientific basis. The institute…
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IWH-DPE-Absolventen-Platzierungen
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Department Profiles
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Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
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Charts
Info Graphs Sometimes pictures say more than a thousand words. Therefore, we selected a few graphs to present our main topics visually. If you should have any questions or would…
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Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is constructed, how it works, how to keep it fit and what good a bit of chocolate can do. Dossier In…
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The Political Economy of the European Banking Union Junior Professorship Lena Tonzer, PhD: The Political Economy of the European Banking Union: Causes for National Differences in…
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Insights for Young Researchers in Finance
FYI – Insights for Young Researchers in Finance The Insights for Young Researchers in Finance (FYI) inform junior researchers (PhDs, post-docs, and assistant professors) in…
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Privacy
Data Protection Policy We take the protection of your personal data very seriously and treat your personal data with confidentiality and in compliance with the provisions of law…
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