Die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance deutscher Banken seit 1950
R. H. Schmidt, Felix Noth
Bankhistorisches Archiv,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
The present paper gives an overview of the development of Corporate Governance of German banks since the 1950s. The focus will be on economic analysis. The most striking changes in Corporate Governance occurred with the ownership structure of commercial banks, in particular with the major joint-stock banks. In addition to that, the capital market has become a core element of Corporate Governance in all major German banks, which have replaced their prior concentration on the interests of a broadly defined circle of stakeholders by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, with savings banks and cooperative cooperative banks, Corporate Governance has remained unchanged for the most part. Exceptions to this are the regional state banks: in their case, after they had turned away from traditional business models and in particular following the discontinuation of the guarantee obligation, the problems of their Corporate Governance, which were already discernible beforehand, became quite obvious. If you include the financial crisis, beginning in 2007, in the analysis, it becomes evident that it was precisely a Corporate Governance unilaterally geared to shareholders’ interest and the efficiency of the capital market that materially contributed to the evolution and widening of the crisis.
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Corporate Governance in the Multinational Enterprise: A Financial Contracting Perspective
Diemo Dietrich, Björn Jindra
International Business Review,
2010
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring economics-based finance research more into the focus of international business theory. On the basis of an analytical model that introduces financial constraints into incomplete contracting in an international vertical trade relationship, we propose an integrated framework that facilitates the study of the interdependencies between internalisation decisions, firm-internal allocations of control rights, and the debt capacity of firms. We argue that the financial constraint of an MNE and/or its supplier should be considered as an important determinant of internal governance structures, complementary to, and interacting with, institutional factors and proprietary knowledge.
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A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, A. K. Kashyap
Europe and the Euro,
2010
Abstract
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking. Data on cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no evidence of integration in retail banking. This paper shows that the previous tests of bank integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration. The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks' profitability. The new test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. European listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level. There is weak evidence that competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show improved profitability. Unlisted European banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being integrated. In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits driven down quickly.
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The Role of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime for Foreign Investors in Post-Socialist Economies
Benedikt Schnellbächer, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2009
Abstract
We integrate international business theory on foreign direct investment (FDI) with institutional theory on intellectual property rights (IPR) to explain characteristics and behaviour of foreign investment subsidiaries in Central East Europe, a region with an IPR regime-gap vis-à-vis West European countries. We start from the premise that FDI may play a crucial role for technological catch-up development in Central East Europe via technology and knowledge transfer. By use of a unique dataset generated at the IWH in collaboration with a European consortium in the framework of an EU-project, we assess the role played by the IPR regimes in a selection of CEE countries as a factor for corporate governance and control of foreign invested subsidiaries, for their own technological activity, their trade relationships, and networking partners for technological activity. As a specific novelty to the literature, we assess the in influence of the strength of IPR regimes on corporate control of subsidiaries and conclude that IPR-sensitive foreign investments tend to have lower functional autonomy, tend to cooperate more intensively within their transnational network and yet are still technologically more active than less IPR-sensitive subsidiaries. In terms of economic policy, this leads to the conclusion that the FDI will have a larger developmental impact if the IPR regime in the host economy is sufficiently strict.
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Comparative Study of Multinational Companies in the Enlarged EU - A Technology Transfer Perspective
Johannes Stephan, Björn Jindra, I. Klugert
Conference Proceedings of „Comparing International Competitiveness of Manufacturing Companies in the EU with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe“,
2007
Abstract
Die Untersuchung liefert einen Beitrag zur Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen der Heterogenität von multinationalen Unternehmen und internationalem Technologietransfer. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf den internen Technologietransfer, also den Transfer vom Mutter- zum Tochterunternehmen. Wir schätzen hierbei den Einfluß von Corporate Governance, Zielstellungen und absorptiver Kapazität des Tochterunternehmens sowie etwaige Effekte der kulturellen und geographischen Distanz als potentielle Determinanten des internen Technologietransfers. Dabei kontrollieren wir für andere firmen- und industriespezifische Effekte als auch unbeobachtete Spezifika des Investitionslandes. Die Hypothesen werden an einem Datensatz mit 434 ausländischen Tochterunternehmen aus einer Umfrage in Polen, Ungarn, Estland, der Slowakei und Slowenien aus dem Jahre 2002/2003 getestet. Die Ergebnisse scheinen zu zeigen, daß die Art der Mutter-Tochter-Beziehung in multinationalen Unternehmen von institutionellen Faktoren, den Zielstellungen der Investition und den verbundenen Risiken für den ausländischen Investor abhängen. Diese Faktoren wiederum haben einen Einfluß auf die Intensität des internen Technologietransfers. Absorptive Kapazität des Tochterunternehmens hat einen positiven Einfluß auf die Intensität des Technologietransfers, geographische Distanz hingegen scheint diese zu behindern. Schlußendlich scheint die Herkunft des ausländischen Investors keinen statistischen Einfluß auf die Intensität des internen Technologietransfers zu haben, wenn wir für Firmen-, Industrie- und Landesspezifika kontrollieren.
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Comply or Explain - Die Akzeptanz von Corporate Governance Kodizes in Deutschland und Großbritannien
Nicole Steinat
Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht,
No. 39,
2005
Abstract
Die zahlreichen Unternehmenszusammenbrüche, Bilanzskandale sowie der Absturz der Indizes an den Kapitalmärkten zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends verstärkten die Diskussion um die Unternehmensführung und -kontrolle in Deutschland und führten schließlich vor nunmehr fast drei Jahren zur Verabschiedung des deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex. Dieser Verhaltenskodex, der sich an börsennotierte Gesellschaften richtet, greift internationale Kritikpunkte an der deutschen Unternehmensverfassung auf und soll somit den Standort Deutschland für ausländische Investoren attraktiver machen und das Vertrauen der Anleger zurückgewinnen. Ob dies gelungen ist, soll in dieser Studie ebenso untersucht werden, wie die Frage, ob und in welchen Bereichen der Kodex mit seinen Anforderungen von den Unternehmen akzeptiert wird...
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Understanding CSR Champions: A Machine Learning Approach
Alona Bilokha, Mingying Cheng, Mengchuan Fu, Iftekhar Hasan
Annals of Operations Research,
2099
Abstract
In this paper, we study champions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance among the U.S. publicly traded firms and their common characteristics by utilizing machine learning algorithms to identify predictors of firms’ CSR activity. We contribute to the CSR and leadership determinants literature by introducing the first comprehensive framework for analyzing the factors associated with corporate engagement with socially responsible behaviors by grouping all relevant predictors into four broad categories: corporate governance, managerial incentives, leadership, and firm characteristics. We find that strong corporate governance characteristics, as manifested in board member heterogeneity and managerial incentives, are the top predictors of CSR performance. Our results suggest policy implications for providing incentives and fostering characteristics conducive to firms “doing good.”
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