Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting
Geraldo Cerqueiro, Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.
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The Importance of Estimation Uncertainty in a Multi-Rating Class Loan Portfolio
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
This article seeks to make an assessment of estimation uncertainty in a multi-rating class loan portfolio. Relationships are established between estimation uncertainty and parameters such as probability of default, intra- and inter-rating class correlation, degree of inhomogeneity, number of rating classes used, number of debtors and number of historical periods used for parameter estimations. In addition, by using an exemplary portfolio based on Moody’s ratings, it becomes clear that estimation uncertainty does indeed have an effect on interest rates.
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Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.
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Is Rated Debt Arm's Length? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Reint E. Gropp, C. Hirsch, Jan Pieter Krahnen
CFS Working Papers, No. 2011/10,
No. 10,
2011
Abstract
In this paper we challenge the view that corporate bonds are always arm's length debt. We analyze the effect of bond ratings on the stock price return to acquirers in M&A transactions, which tend to have significant effects on creditor wealth. We find acquirers abnormal returns to be higher if they are unrated, controlling for a wide variety of other effects identified in the literature. Tracing the difference in returns to distinct managerial decisions, we find that, everything else constant, rated firms increase their leverage in takeover transactions by less than their unrated counterparts. Consistent with a significant role for rating agencies, we find monitoring effects to be strongest when acquirer bonds are rated at the borderline between investment grade and junk. Finally, we are able to empirically exclude a large number of alternative explanations for the empirical regularities that we uncover.
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Credit Union Membership and Use of Internet Banking Technology
H. Evren Damar, Lynn Hunnicutt
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
What makes households use internet banking? Bank adoption of internet banking technology has been widely considered, but relatively few papers address consumer usage of internet banking. This study looks at the determinants of internet banking usage among credit union members in the Western United States. We use call report data from the National Credit Union Administration to calculate the rate of internet banking usage among a credit union's members, which allows us to examine whether variations in institutional characteristics, local economic conditions and membership criteria have an impact on the internet usage rates among members of different credit unions. We find that members in credit unions that were early internet technology adopters have higher usage rates, and that the contribution to usage rates varies among types of online services offered.
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The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Bonitätsbewertungen durch Rating-Agenturen gewinnen durch die unter dem Stichwort Basel II diskutierten Reformvorschläge zur Bankenregulierung an Bedeutung. Insbesondere hängt das durch die Regulierung geforderte Mindesteigenkapital unter dem standardisierten Ansatz von Basel II von der Bewertung der Kreditrisiken durch externe Rating-Agenturen ab. Bonitätsbewertungen, speziell von souveränen Schuldnern, bestimmen damit wesentlich die Höhe des Mindesteigenkapitals von Banken. In der Vergangenheit haben Rating-Agenturen Währungskrisenrisiken systematisch unterschätzt. Diese sind jedoch für die Bewertung des Kreditausfallrisikos souveräner Schuldner wichtig. Die prozyklischen Effekte von Basel II entstehen vor allem dadurch, daß im Fall von Währungskrisen aufgrund der zu positiven Bewertung im Vorfeld der Krise schlagartig massive Herabstufungen notwendig werden. Diese Effekte können nur minimiert werden, wenn die währungskriseninduzierten Kreditausfallrisiken angemessen berücksichtigt werden. Die Kritik an der Methode der Rating-Agenturen, insbesondere an mangelnder Berücksichtigung neuerer Währungskrisenmodelle infolge der Asienkrisen von 1997/98, führte zu Reaktionen der Agenturen. So sagte z. B. Standard and Poor’s die Berücksichtigung mikroökonomischer Indikatoren zu, die bei aktuellen Krisen als Krisenfaktoren erkannt wurden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird anhand eines Beispiels untersucht, inwiefern sich empirische Anzeichen dafür erkennen lassen, daß mikroökonomische Indikatoren in der Praxis der Bonitätsprüfung beachtet werden. Das Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchungen zeigt, daß traditionelle makroökonomische Indikatoren die Rating-Ergebnisse dominieren. In aktuellen Ratings können keine Anzeichen für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Mikro-Indikatoren gefunden werden. Es muß daher geschlußfolgert werden, daß, wie in der Wirtschaft im Wandel 8/2007 ausgeführt, auch weiterhin prozyklische, krisenverstärkende Effekte von Basel II ausgehen. Die Rating-Agenturen erfüllen bislang die Rolle als frühzeitige Antizipatoren für Währungskrisenrisiken unzureichend.
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Money and Credit Market Integration in an enlarging Euro Zone: Methodological Issues
Johannes Stephan, Jens Hölscher
European Economic Policies - Alteratives to Orthodox Analysis and Policy Concepts,
2006
Abstract
“The chapter discusses methodological issues of money and credit market integration within the context of an enlarging Euro area. Common methods of interest parity tests are rejected in favour of a comparison of nominal interest rates. Hölscher and Stephan find that from an institutional point of view the new EU member countries look under-banked, whereas interest rates are converging. As policy implication the paper argues for a Euro adoption of the new EU members rather sooner than later.“
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
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Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand
Reint E. Gropp, J. K. Scholz, M. J. White
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
1997
Abstract
This paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit. While generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policy-makers as benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that they increase the amount of credit held by high-asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low-asset households, conditioning on observable characteristics. Thus, bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets. Interest rates on automobile loans for low-asset households also appear to be higher in high exemption states.
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