Can R&D Subsidies Counteract the Economic Crisis? – Macroeconomic Effects in Germany
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Jutta Günther, Brigitte Loose, Udo Ludwig, Nicole Nulsch
Research Policy,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
During the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, governments in Europe stabilized their economies by means of fiscal policy. After decades of absence, deficit spending was used to counteract the heavy decline in demand. In Germany, public spending went partially into R&D subsidies in favor of small and medium sized enterprises. Applying the standard open input–output model, the paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of R&D subsidies on employment and production in the business cycle. Findings in the form of backward multipliers suggest that R&D subsidies have stimulated a substantial leverage effect. Almost two thirds of the costs of R&D projects are covered by the enterprises themselves. Overall, a subsidized R&D program results in a production, value added and employment effect that amounts to at least twice the initial financing. Overall, the R&D program counteracts the decline of GDP by 0.5% in the year 2009. In the year 2010 the effects are already procyclical since the German economy recovered quickly. Compared to the strongly discussed alternative uses of subsidies for private consumption, R&D spending is more effective.
Read article
Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
Read article
4. IWH/INFER-Workshop on Applied Economics and Economic Policy: “A New Fiscal Capacity for the EU?“
Birgit Schultz, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Am 17. und 18. März 2014 fand am IWH in Zusammenarbeit mit dem International Network for Economic Research (INFER) der 4. Workshop „Applied Economics and Economic Policy“ statt. Im Rahmen des Workshops stellten Wissenschaftler europäischer Universitäten und internationaler Organisationen ihre neuesten Forschungsergebnisse zu aktuellen ökonomischen Fragen und Problemen vor. Dabei war es nicht nur Ziel der Veranstaltung, aktuelle Forschungsergebnisse vorzustellen, sondern auch mit Vertretern aus Wissenschaft und Praxis über die aktuelle Wirtschaftspolitik und das Spezialthema „A New Fiscal Capacity for the EU?“ zu diskutieren.
Read article
Toward a Taylor Rule for Fiscal Policy
Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky
Review of Economic Dynamics,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in US data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are better described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and investment, respectively. We show that conditioning on these variables is also desirable from a normative perspective as it significantly improves welfare relative to output-based rules.
Read article
Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.
Read article
Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
Read article
