Attribute Dependence and the Provision of Quality
Hans Degryse, Andreas Irmen
Regional Science and Urban Economics,
No. 5,
2001
Abstract
Often a quality improvement necessitates modifications of varietal product features. This paper studies firms’ incentives to provide quality when this decision affects the goods’ degree of perceived horizontal differentiation. We find that the quality level hinges crucially on the interaction between the quality and the varietal product attribute. We examine the outcome of a game where firms decide on quality and price relative to what a social planner would desire. If the interaction between quality and perceived horizontal differentiation is sufficiently positive, we find for the sequential game ‘quality then price’ that the private incentives to provide quality are excessive relative to the social optimum. As a result the level and the direction of interaction between the attributes determines whether there is excessive or insufficient provision of quality.
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Germany 1997: Slow, export generated expansion
Udo Ludwig, Silke Tober, Ruth Grunert, Ingrid Haschke, Martin Snelting, Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Brigitte Loose
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
1997
Abstract
Mit dem Jahresausblick für 1997 wird die Konjunkturprognose von Mitte 1996 für das Jahr 1997 aktualisiert. Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion erhält im Jahr 1997 infolge der anziehenden Weltkonjunktur und der Normalisierung des Außenwerts der D-Mark Impulse vom Export. Die Selbstverstärkung des Aufschwungs wird schwach bleiben, da die verfügbaren Einkommen der privaten Haushalte nur geringen Spielraum für zusätzlichen Konsum bieten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird 1997 mit 2,1 % expandieren. Der Aufschwung bleibt jedoch zu schwach, um einen Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit zu ermöglichen.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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