An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in The Netherlands
Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre, Hans Degryse
De Economist,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.
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Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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Stale Information, Shocks, and Volatility
Reint E. Gropp, A. Kadareja
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 6,
2012
Abstract
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information on volatility. Using intraday data, we estimate the effect of a well-identified shock on the volatility of stock returns of European banks as a function of the quality of public information available about the banks. We hypothesize that as publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence increase, as private information of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We further show that stock volatility is higher just before important announcements if information is stale.
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What Drives Banking Sector Fragility in the Eurozone? Evidence from Stock Market Data
Stefan Eichler, Karol Sobanski
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
This article explores the determinants of banking sector fragility in the eurozone. For this purpose, a stock-market-based banking sector fragility indicator is calculated for eight member countries from 1999 to 2009 using the Merton model (1974). Using a panel framework, it is found that the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the banking sector and the intensity of banking regulation all have an effect on banking sector fragility in the eurozone.
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Extreme Dependence with Asymmetric Thresholds: Evidence for the European Monetary Union
Stefan Eichler, R. Herrera
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
Existing papers on extreme dependence use symmetrical thresholds to define simultaneous stock market booms or crashes such as the joint occurrence of the upper or lower one percent return quantile in both stock markets. We show that the probability of the joint occurrence of extreme stock returns may be higher for asymmetric thresholds than for symmetric thresholds. We propose a non-parametric measure of extreme dependence which allows capturing extreme events for different thresholds and can be used to compute different types of extreme dependence. We find that extreme dependence among the stock markets of ten initial EMU member countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States is largely asymmetrical in the pre-EMU period (1989–1998) and largely symmetrical in the EMU period (1999–2010). Our findings suggest that ignoring the possibility of asymmetric extreme dependence may lead to an underestimation of the probability of co-booms and co-crashes.
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Stock Market Firm-Level Information and Real Economic Activity
Filippo di Mauro, Fabio Fornari, Dario Mannucci
ECB Working Paper,
No. 1366,
2011
Abstract
We provide evidence that changes in the equity price and volatility of individual firms (measures that approximate the definition of 'granular shock' given in Gabaix, 2010) are key to improve the predictability of aggregate business cycle fluctuations in a number of countries. Specifically, adding the return and the volatility of firm-level equity prices to aggregate financial information leads to a significant improvement in forecasting business cycle developments in four economic areas, at various horizons. Importantly, not only domestic firms but also foreign firms improve business cycle predictability for a given economic area. This is not immediately visible when one takes an unconditional standpoint (i.e. an average across the sample). However, conditioning on the business cycle position of the domestic economy, the relative importance of the two sets of firms - foreign and domestic - exhibits noticeable swings across time. Analogously, the sectoral classification of the firms that in a given month retain the highest predictive power for future IP changes also varies significantly over time as a function of the business cycle position of the domestic economy. Limited to the United States, predictive ability is found to be related to selected balance sheet items, suggesting that structural features differentiate the firms that can anticipate aggregate fluctuations from those that do not help to this aim. Beyond the purely forecasting application, this finding may enhance our understanding of the underlying origins of aggregate fluctuations. We also propose to use the cross sectional stock market information to macro-prudential aims through an economic Value at Risk.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 5,
2011
Abstract
Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.
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Stock Market-Induced Currency Crises: A New Type of Twins
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Review of Development Economics,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
This paper explores the link between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. By integrating foreign stock market investors in a currency crisis model, we reveal a new fundamental inconsistency as a potential crisis trigger: since emerging economies' stock markets often have high returns, whereas central bank reserves grow slowly or decline, the amount of reserves foreign investors can deplete when selling their stocks and repatriating the proceeds grows over time and is considerably higher than funds that have been invested in the stock market. Capital withdrawals of foreign stock market investors can trigger currency crises by depleting central bank reserves, particularly in successful countries with booming stock markets and large foreign investment.
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