Real Effective Exchange Rate Misalignment in the Euro Area: A Counterfactual Analysis
Makram El-Shagi, Axel Lindner, Gregor von Schweinitz
Review of International Economics,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
The European debt crisis has revealed severe imbalances within the Euro area, sparking a debate about the magnitude of those imbalances, in particular concerning real effective exchange rate misalignments. We use synthetic matching to construct a counterfactual economy for each member state in order to identify the degree of these misalignments. We find that crisis countries are best described as a combination of advanced and emerging economies. Comparing the actual real effective exchange rate with those of the counterfactuals gives evidence of misalignments before the outbreak of the crisis: all peripheral countries appear strongly and significantly overvalued.
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Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions
Alexander Kriwoluzky, G. J. Müller, M. Wolf
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2015
Abstract
Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009 to 2012.
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EFN Report Autumn 2015: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016
European Forecasting Network Reports,
No. 4,
2015
Abstract
For the end of this year and for 2016, chances are good that production in advanced economies will continue to expand a bit faster than at trend rates, while growth dynamics in emerging markets economies will not strengthen or even continue to decrease.
Since autumn 2014, production in the euro area expands at an annualized rate of about 1.5%. The recovery appears to be broad based, with contributions from private consumption, exports, and investment into fixed capital, although it fell back in the second quarter after a strong increase at the beginning of the year. From a regional perspective, the recovery is as well quite broad based: production is expanding in almost every country, surprisingly and according to official data, including Greece.
Structural impediments still limit the ability of the euro area economy to grow strongly: firms and, in particular, private households are only slowly reducing their heavy debt burdens.
According to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.6% in 2015 and by 1.9% in 2016. The high increase in the number of refugees in 2015 will, in principle, positively affect private as well as public consumption, but the effect should be below 0.1 percentage points relative to GDP.
Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.1%. For 2016, we expect that inflation will increase to 1.3%, which is still below the ECB’s target of 2%.
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Negative Bonitätsbewertungen und Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen – Gibt es einen Teufelskreis?
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
Kann es nach einer Herabstufung der Bonität eines Staates zu einer Dynamik von steigenden Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen und weiter fallenden Ratings kommen, die unausweichlich in einem Staatsbankrott endet? Die hohe Persistenz von Ratings sowie die Beobachtung, dass Zinsen häufig negativ auf eine Herabstufung reagieren, legen die Möglichkeit einer solchen Abwärtsspirale nahe. Empirisch ist diese Dynamik allerdings nicht zu sehen. In den Daten ist im Gegenteil ausschließlich eine sehr langsame Annäherung an ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht von guten Ratings und niedrigen Zinsen zu beobachten. Gleichzeitig ist die Persistenz von Ratings allerdings hoch genug, um nach einer Herabstufung auf ein hochspekulatives Niveau (Rating von B oder schlechter) massive und langandauernde Zinsaufschläge zu erzeugen. Da eine solche Herabstufung in der Realität allerdings äußerst selten erfolgt, ist die Existenz des oben beschriebenen Teufelskreises zu verneinen. Eine negative Entwicklung wie zum Beispiel in Griechenland in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 lässt sich nicht als Ergebnis der Wechselwirkung von Ratings und Zinsen erklären.
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The Euro Plus Pact: Competitiveness and External Capital Flows in the EU Countries
Hubert Gabrisch, K. Staehr
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
The Euro Plus Pact was approved by the European Union countries in March 2011. The pact stipulates various measures to strengthen competitiveness with the ultimate aim of preventing accumulation of unsustainable external imbalances. This article uses Granger causality tests to assess the short-term linkages between changes in relative unit labour costs and changes in the current account balance for the period 1995–2011. The main finding is that changes in the current account balance precede changes in relative unit labour costs, while there is no discernible effect in the opposite direction. This suggests that capital flows from the European core to the periphery contributed to the divergence in unit labour costs across Europe prior to the global financial crisis. The results also suggest that the measures to restrain unit labour costs may have only limited effect on the current account balance in the short term.
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